Part Four
Many internal factors in the armed services also made them a threat to society, and some external factors have also contributed to the military’s disunity.
For instance, the problem of a continuing economic decline, the threat of communist insurgency and Moro secessionism and the worsening crime situation have made the armed services inordinately very large and indispensable to the orderly conduct of public affairs.
We often hear some critics say soldiers and policemen are just “security guards.” Perhaps, they don’t realize that they are guards who are daily putting their lives on the line, and many of them had to shed blood in the service of the country.
The people cannot expect soldiers and policemen to be merely mute witnesses to the affairs of the State because they are as much affected as other people are, especially when the civilian government fails to exercise leadership at the helm, and the problems of peace and order deteriorate, rather than improve, as a consequence of ineptness and corruption.
For instance, the Davide Commission (named after then chairman and Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.) on the 1989 coup attempt, significantly made recommendations that recognized how many were the problems that underpinned military coups and mutinies in the country.
It recognized the need for short-term measures to prevent another coup attempt. But it pointed out, as well, the need for reforms and long-term measures to eradicate the problem.
The commission set forth recommendations for ensuring the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. The principal prescription was the appointment of civilians to head the Department of National Defense, the National Security Council and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency.
Finally, it made recommendations over the long term that touched on the need for reforms concerning social justice, decentralization, democratic change, patriotism, constitutionalism and the building of a citizens’ army. Exactly 27 years ago today, the reforms needed remained unattended to, and many of the problems have even worsened with the passage of time.
For instance, the pervasive culture of favoritism and patronage in the armed services has turned from bad to worse in Arroyo’s time: the chief of staff position had changed hands nine times in less than eight of her nine years in office and for the first time in the military’s history—from Gen. Diomedio Villanueva, to Gen. Roy Cimatu, to Gen. Benjamin Defensor, to Gen. Dionisio Santiago, to Gen. Narcisco Abaya, to Gen. Efren Abu, to Gen. Generoso Senga, to Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. and to Gen. Alexander Yano, in that order, thus, further creating demoralization in the armed services.
The military also suffered from a serious shortage of qualified NCOs and small unit leaders due to unjustified expansion and decline in combat and administrative training, which, in turn, contributed to the breakdown of morale and discipline.
Although limited equipment have somehow reached to the battlefield, troops often operated without most of the basic needs because of graft and corruption, patronage and favoritism, which tended to aggravate the unreliable logistics system that often necessitated the use of personal contacts and bribery to obtain crucial supplies, particularly weapons, bullets, quartermaster items, transportation and communication equipment.
The recent spate of attacks by the New People’s Army in Southern Tagalog, Bicol region, Central Luzon, Northern Mindanao and the Visayas, where scores of soldiers had been killed and wounded, clearly illustrated the foregoing.
Even if the police and military organizations do not suffer from these defects, they cannot hope to win the insurgent war or improve the peace and order situation for the simple reason that they do not have a doctrine of their own or a clearly defined tactical and strategic direction.
No president, therefore, can do the job alone. He must be guided with the right combination of policies and be able to call upon a talented pool of men and women in the civilian bureaucracy, supported by the members of the police and military organizations.
In the final analysis, the president can bring them together as a team, combining all their talents to produce a cohesive and responsive bureaucracy, certainly not the kind of bureaucracy that increases in number of temporary committees, commissions or task forces every time there is a crisis and, thus, inordinately expand the size of the government and the budget.
How to handle personalities is certainly important. It is a question of personal pride, power and prestige. A president must have a good memory and a sense of history, including the kind of history that the country had already seen for more than five generations.
To be continued
To reach the writer, e-mail cecilio.arillo@gmail.com.