THE conflict in Syria is entering a critical phase. Turkey has at long last entered the fight, conducting airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) targets in Syria—and capitalizing on the opportunity to attack Kurdistan Workers’ Party militants in northern Iraq.
Turkey’s newfound vigor is fueled by a convergence of US and Turkish interest in the region, evidenced by the July 23 agreement between Ankara and Washington to allow US forces to use Incirlik Air Base. There is a shared interest in combating the IS, and both countries want to see a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian conflict that would end the fighting and remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power.
Al-Assad’s frank July 26 comments about the level of fatigue in the Syrian army, combined with the continued success of Syrian rebel groups and the prospect of Turkey’s increased participation, could indicate that the al-Assad regime itself is considering its options.
US Secretary of State John Kerry will travel to Doha on August 3, where he will discuss the future of Syria with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Stratfor has been tracking the evolution and perspectives of the key parties involved in the Syrian conflict from the opening of hostilities. We are publishing this chronology to highlight our previous analyses and forecasts.
Stratfor’s third-quarter forecast 2015
July 8, 2015: With government forces on the defensive on multiple fronts, Syria will be a focal point for regional competition going into the quarter. Iranian and Russian economic and military sponsorship of al-Assad’s government will endure, but the government is still unlikely to go on the offensive, as long as it is stretched thin and lacking momentum. That said, a break point on the Syrian battlefield will not occur this quarter. Loyalist forces will be able to retain a weakening presence in the north in Aleppo while holding down a critical corridor running from Damascus up through Homs to the coast. Rebel forces will seriously threaten approaches to the government forces’ core, particularly around Hama and from the south in Daraa.
Talk of a political arrangement after al-Assad will gain momentum as the battle progresses. Russia and the US appear to be working to identify ranking Alawite officers who would be part of such an arrangement—and critical to maintaining the institutions of the state—as well as rebel factions that would be willing to come to the negotiating table with al Assad’s removal as a precondition. As we noted last quarter, Russia will play a big role in the negotiating effort, not only to try to maintain its influence in the Levant but also to build up a US dependence on Moscow in the Middle East that Russia can use as leverage in its standoff with the West.
Considering a Post-al-assad Syria
June 12, 2015: Within the first year of the Syrian rebellion, a number of intelligence agencies and media outlets said the government of al-Assad had only months to live. Stratfor saw it differently. The battle was proceeding at a rapid pace, and things definitely looked dicey for the government at times, but we knew this would be a protracted fight. For one thing, the Alawites, while a naturally fractious lot, were facing an existential crisis against a Sunni majority and were not going to crumble easily. For another, the divisions within the rebel landscape (and among the rebels’ foreign sponsors) were so great that both sides lacked the means to overwhelm and defeat the other. Many of those constraints still apply, but things are now moving in a direction that admittedly has us on the edge in contemplating a scenario after al-Assad.
Russia’s search for leverage in the Syrian crisis
December 12, 2012: Russia and the US are engaged in seemingly urgent negotiations over Syria. The Syrian chemical weapons threat that the US has been publicly emphasizing may provide an opportunity for Russia to regain leverage in Syria after the fall of al-Assad’s regime.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held an impromptu 40-minute meeting on December 6 hosted by United Nations-Arab League Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi on the sidelines of a European security meeting in Dublin. Earlier in the day, Clinton and Lavrov spoke privately for about 25 minutes. The focus of the meetings was reportedly recent chemical weapons activity in Syria. Few details on the outcome of the meetings have surfaced, but both sides have given the impression that talks are moving forward to try to ensure a stable transition to a post-al-Assad Syria.
Turkey’s challenge and the Syrian negotiation
October 16, 2012: Syrian Information Minister Omran al-Zubi harshly criticized the Turkish government early last week over Ankara’s proposal that an interim government succeed the al-Assad regime, saying that “Turkey isn’t the Ottoman Sultanate; the Turkish Foreign Ministry doesn’t name custodians in Damascus, Mecca, Cairo and Jerusalem.” Being the spokesman for a pariah regime requires a mastery of propaganda. Al-Zubi has not disappointed in this regard, mounting a strong rhetorical offensive against Syria’s powerful northern neighbor.
While his latest rebuke of Turkey will not save the al-Assad regime (much less his own career), he is tapping into a powerful narrative in the region, one that will have stronger and stronger resonance in the Arab world as Turkey is forced to play a more assertive role in the region.
Considering a palace coup in Syria
August 7, 2012: al-Assad’s regime has maintained its hold on power amid escalating violence and international criticism over the past year. However, pressure on the regime could eventually increase to a point that other members of the inner circle may attempt to supplant the al-Assad clan. This small group of elites could even receive backing from Syria’s allies, Russia and Iran.
Stratfor