THIS is a job for our legislators in Congress and the Executive branch to look over because the defense budget passes through them and the right mix of national security policies are crafted by them and their expert advisers.
What we have today in the armed services is the unified command (UC) concept that is very expensive to maintain. It removed the distinctions between maritime, land and air operations; and it produces more armchair generals.
A study conducted by this writer showed that the UC concept is better suited for conventional warfare rather than for guerrilla warfare.
Besides, there is a great value in the separate identities and distinct characteristics of the Navy, Army and Air Force as the needs of the modern battlefield require the specialist skills, fast transport and communications, armaments and high-density explosives.
Various arguments for the UC concept appeared persuasive, but such impressions need to be critically examined. While there is a general absence of economics literature on the UC concept, Congress and the Executive branch should look at the subject by focusing initially on the economics of defense and the need for difficult choices in an environment of uncertainty.
A starting point requires an in-depth study of the present multi-layered command structure, particularly the UC or joint operations, which are not actually a new concept as they were implemented on an ad hoc basis by the allied forces during the European and the Pacific wars.
The official literature claims two major arguments for UC. First, the armed forces together provide a greater capability than the sum of their individual parts; and second, UC offers efficiency savings through rationalization and the elimination of wasteful duplication.
But, as with merger of services, the study believes that any advantages of a UC would be outweighed by the damaging impact on the economy and the ethos, morale and operational effectiveness of the men in uniform, especially if you put a premium on the need to retain the individuality and separate identity of the three services with their specialist skills, loyalty and commitment.
Besides, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the police, have maintained separate defensive and offensive capabilities using different variants of guerrilla warfare, which is the situation in the Philippines. Each used its own cost-effective operating procedures, command and control systems, maintenance support chains and training programs.
The narrow justification for opting a UC concept for the armed services is this: there are unlimited demands for new equipment, personnel and bases, but the resources available for defense spending were limited. This problem had been accentuated by rising equipment costs at about 20 percent yearly in real terms.
Narrow in the sense that the planners did not consider that maintaining the present multilayered command structure would require enormous overhead expenses.
For example, under the present command structure are seven UCs, namely, Northern Luzon Command; Southern Luzon Command; National Capital Region Command; Central Command; Western Command; Eastern Mindanao Command; and the Western Mindanao Command.
In addition, there are the AFP-wide support services and units that report directly to the AFP General Headquarters: AFP General Headquarters and Headquarters Service Command; General Headquarters and Headquarters Service Command (GHQ & HSC), act as the fourth Major Service Command representing the support, technical and independent services of the Armed Forces; Technical and Administrative Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines; Presidential Security Group; Philippine Military Academy; Armed Forces of the Philippines Commissary and Exchange Service; Communications, Electronics and Information System Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines; Civil Relations Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines; Armed Forces of the Philippines, Dental Service Center; and the National Defense College of the Philippines.
At a glance, you have here headquarters operating over the existing general headquarter whose functions and responsibilities overlap with the latter.
For example, the Army alone has 10 divisions, 30 brigades, 90 battalions scattered all over the country with separate headquarters complete with the usual line services: intelligence, personnel, operations and logistics.
There are a host of broad choices for defense policy-makers to consider to correct the flawed command structure and one of these is a major defense review of the structure and troops commitment in relation to the nature of threats (e.g., its commitment to provide a complete range of air, land and sea forces and the size of forces in Mindanao where three UCs are operating but fighting only a guerrilla war).
In this context, the disbanding of the UC and adopting the pre-martial law command structure, which was lean, mean and highly professional, offers an efficiency improvement by maximizing defense capability from a limited budget and/or providing cost savings through the right combination of policies (e.g., economic rationalization, avoiding duplication of functions and responsibilities and from shared training and support activities).
For instance, the P401.14-billion defense budget approved by President Aquino for 2016 provides only limited information on the costs of UC concept.
Some further insights into the multilayered command structure are provided by employment data for service and civilian personnel at the AFP Headquarters in Camp Aguinaldo.
Again, these are only part of the limited data available for analysis at the AFP Headquarters and there is a need for Congress and the Executive branch to review the command and control structures, and establish its own databank and retrieval system to provide the public accurate information on how defense and security spending is made in relation to the country’s local, national and global security situations.
To reach the writer, e-mail cecilio.arillo@gmail.com