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Conclusion
This
doctrine, fired from the hip to preempt asset
dissipation against banks proven insolvent, is
self-explanatory. Upon insolvency and where there is an
imminent danger that an insolvent bank’s assets may be
dissipated, then authorities invoke the doctrine. In
summary fashion, they preemptively cuff a bank under
receivership even before hearings for explanations or
curative measures are discussed.
The
process appears draconian. It is not. It does not deny
due process. At least, theoretically. It simply places
due process as an afterthought, the carriage before the
horse where closure, seizure and receivership are
preemptively applied before a panic-induced bank run
squanders assets.
In
reality, however, its threatened application, combined
with disinformation spun by paid hacks or underpaid beat
reporters, becomes self-fulfilling. Compromise
confidence and fundamentals matter less and less. The
threat alone induces a run. But since bank runs are
panic attacks, often devoid of reason, inordinate
importance is placed upon illusions, and here media is
critical.
Last
week we saw where 10 banks with proven financial probity
and fundamentals surpassing even the most demanding
might be threatened by entities recklessly alluding to
insolvency.
The
bank’s 2008 consolidated fundamentals debunk illusions
woven by paid hacks, and yet, ploys to foment panic seem
to be in play. Never mind that a 17.06-percent
consolidated liquidity ratio and a robust current ratio
exceed safeguards against illiquidity and insolvency and
erase iffy conditionalities that justify the doctrine.
More
important, fresh capital was systematically infused to
gear up capital bases. Yet, from some dark and dank
shadow, directed at an unknowing public, someone yelled,
“Fire!”
Truth be
told, first in 2005 and then in 2007, the bank’s capital
was insufficient against rising requisites that compel
capital infusions. But that was 2005 and 2007. This is
2008. As of June, the banks are currently over 12.76
percent in official capital-adequacy ratios (CAR), way
beyond the requisite 10 percent set by the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Unfortunately, payolas fattened by illegal lotteries
swell open palms. The fears of a smear campaign were
confirmed recently when a runner spreading prepackaged
derogatory and unsigned “white papers” was arrested
after attempts to extort from the banks failed,
eventually triggering retaliatory disinformation.
Nevertheless, someone should train predisposed beat
reporters how to count with more than their fingers. The
10 banks’ updated solvency ratio based on total assets
of P16,301,778,866.24 over total liabilities of
P14,457,553,552.09 is beyond a 1.1276 multiple. That’s a
liability cover way over 112.76 percent.
Analyzed
with fresh funds booked as deposits for capital
subscription temporarily lodged under “other
liabilities,” this increases the solvency ratio and
insures against asset dissipation. Neither prospective
nor illusory, this infusion is real and verifiable.
Solvency
simply matches assets against liabilities. By including
Tiers 1 and 2 capital, coverage exceeds the most
demanding safety requisites. For the 10 banks, the only
way to lure their CAR into the web of the Close-Now,
Hear-Later Doctrine is through undervaluation or an
outright disregard for as much as P1.23 billion of
consolidated assets.
Is that
the gambit? A dated document arguing a related issue
cited three aspects mulled over against what were
loosely described as “financially troubled banks.”
One
refers to “serious problems affecting solvency as
manifested in their insolvent financial condition” (itals
supplied). Another refers to “critical under
capitalization.” The last refers to “poor asset
quality.”
The
document is a 19-months old memorandum dated February
13, 2007, and referring to dated audits and one
conducted nearly four years ago on April 30, 2005.
Before, “recommendation[s] placing the banks under
receivership,” some people should grab those free
calendars handed out when they purchase anti-senility
medication.
CAR is
the ratio of qualifying capital over gross risk-weighted
assets. While there is a list for qualifying capital,
only Tier 1 is definitive. Qualifying capital includes
Tier 2, comprised of long-term liabilities subject to
variable aging, redemption values and other moving
targets.
Risk-weighted assets, specifically receivables, are,
likewise, aged and can improve or deteriorate within an
audit period. Because of lags, examination reports are
never in real time and capital and asset counts will
always be in the past tense.
Updating
is critical. For the 10 banks, should deficiencies have
ballooned as of July 31, 2007, these were erased by June
2008 when combined capital increased from P250 million
to P1.95 billion following a P1.8-billion infusion
booked as “deposits for subscriptions,” the latter
pending approval of amended capital ceilings.
Upon
approval, P1.8 billion is reclassified to capital
accounts reflecting its true nature, thus, increasing
the current ratio. In 2008, to be insolvent, “poor asset
quality” needs to breach P1.23 billion. The freshly
infused P1.8 billion adequately covers those.
A
P1.8-billion infusion into the rural economic system is
needed. Never mind if it threatens competitors paling in
financial stature. More when we consider a 12-percent
CAR and the prospect of even more infused increasing
capital adequacy to 48 percent, surpassing even the
commercial banks’ systemwide benchmark.
Freshly
infused funds, solvency and capital adequacy cannot be
dismissed. Section 30 of Republic Act (RA) 7653
declares, “The Monetary Board may summarily and without
need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing
business.” Premised where “a bank has insufficient
realizable assets. . . to meet its liabilities,” the
genetic DNA is Section 29 of RA 265 covering the Central
Bank, the BSP’s forerunner, where an assessment leads to
a finding that “such condition to be one of insolvency”
(itals supplied).
Thus,
solvency is central. But so are updated fundamentals,
capital adequacy and the truth critical in rural
economies ruled by political sycophants and jueteng
kingpins who perpetuate poverty to keep victims
dependent on gambling as a revenue source. Strong rural
banks offering revenue-generating financial facilities
provide antijueteng options. Unfortunately,
media-induced insolvency can result from reckless
threats of the Close-Now, Hear-Later Doctrine.
If we
value capital investments to counter jueteng-operated
rural economies, then it behooves us to do the math
before we succumb to illusions conjured by those
threatened by imminent rural prosperity. |