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ARE you
looking for clues as to the possible outcome of the
American “democratization project” in
Iraq?
Try reading David Rooney’s Guerrilla: Insurgents,
Rebels and Terrorists from Sun Tzu to Bin Laden (Brassey’s
UK, 2004). This book tells us about the histories, as
well as the theory and practice, of guerrilla warfare
from the ancient days up to the present, featuring a
major cast of colorful characters including Judah
Maccabee of ancient Israel, the Boer commandos, Michael
Collins of the Irish Republican Army, Lawrence of
Arabia, Giuseppe Garibaldi of Italy, the Chindits of
Burma, Mao Zedong, Joseph Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Che
Guevarra and Osama bin Ladin.
Reading
the book, one can’t help but feel that the Americans in
Iraq will eventually have to leave soon—and leave in
disgrace. It’s because guerrillas are usually effective
when the raison d’etre of the guerrilla struggle is the
presence of a foreign occupier. There’s an overwhelming
proof for this: Spanish guerrillas drove away Napoleon
Bonaparte out of Spain; the Boers brought the British to
the negotiating table and got the status of a free
state; Michael Collins forced the British to negotiate
for the eventual creation of a modern Irish state; Mao
helped drive away the Japanese to eventually capture
state power in China; Tito drove the Germans and became
Yugoslavia’s head of state; the VietCong drove the
Americans out of Vietnam; the mujahideens drove the
Russians away leading to the disintegration of the
Soviet Union.
Rooney
said despite these long histories of guerrilla
struggles, the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare
hardly changed. All those successful guerrillas adhered
to the concepts first codified by Sun Tzu and little has
changed since then: the use of terrain, mobility,
deception, surprise attack and dispersal, avoiding set
battles, the use of secure base, and swimming like fish
in the water (the masses), persistence, discipline, the
role of propaganda and psychological warfare, among many
others. Most of the successful practitioners adapted Sun
Tzu’s concepts to specific terrain and context but the
basic doctrines remained unchanged. Mao summarized it so
well: “The enemy advances, we retreat. The enemy camps,
we harass. The enemy tires, we attack. The enemy
retreats, we pursue.”
According to Rooney, however, bin Ladin added a new
dimension—religion and his quest to have a weapon of
mass destruction, thus making guerrilla warfare an even
more potent weapon among the discontented and the
fanatics. If bin Laden or his al-Qaeda succeeds in
getting WMD, especially nukes, he might just redefine
and bring guerrilla warfare up to a higher level—to the
world’s great peril.
The
determined guerrilla sometimes wins not because of
decisive military victories but because foreign
occupiers eventually have to leave. And they do leave
earlier than expected when they realize it’s no longer
politically prudent to stay a minute longer because
citizens and politicians back home are increasingly
grumbling about the huge expenses in terms of lives,
money and materiel.
General
Giap’s army in
Vietnam
was practically broken during the Tet Offensive and the
Americans could have given it a coup de grâce but the
citizens back home have had enough of the carnage,
mayhem and body bags. So the Americans had to leave—and
they left ignominiously.
Not all
guerrilla movements succeed, though. An example of this
is the defeat of the Communist guerrillas in the
Federation of Malaya, now Malaysia, by the British SAS
and local troops. But the defeat of guerrillas is not at
all discussed at length in this book, thus giving us a
rather one-sided view of the whole issue. This is the
real downer on this book. The discussion of failed
guerrilla movements could have given us deeper and
balanced insights as to this very important facet of
world historical change.
Overall,
however, the book is a good read, despite occasional
lapses in grammar and editing. And it could be
disturbing to those who are in the business of
protecting the status quo. |
