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If
external local and foreign auditors were to conduct an
unscheduled audit of specific government agencies, they
may just discover either mismatches of fund usage, or
worse, funds on furlough, either unaccounted for or
outrightly absent from both books and coffers.
This has
happened before, where money earmarked for agricultural
usage was applied against less productive nonfarm-related
endeavors. The fertilizer fund scam is one such example.
The equally brazen malversation of road-user’s tax is
another.
In each,
public funds slipped into pockets to capitalize private
enterprise. The precedents are legion. In its most
destructive applications, treasury funds found their way
to private equity, either as booty capital or behest
loans and privileges.
A behest
loan to a private construction company was once
incorporated into the national debt, leaving the public
paying for both the fruits and rot of booty capital. In
another, government privileges crossed the forbidden
divide and enriched private benefactors, as duties
foregone founded the dirt on which booty capital took
root, and grew like wild weed.
For some
these have unraveled. Others have not. Rather than be
caught by the long arm of justice, many remain
untouchables, believing booty capital theirs. And like
regrown octopus tentacles, booty capital extended into
other businesses and other generations. So, as funds are
juggled around infrastructure spending, food- security
budgets yield increasingly less productivity, thus
escalating the hunger statistic further.
Anyone
scrutinizing government infrastructure using state
equity will probably encounter not just quick
sleight-of-hand shifts in applications but something
more akin to an illusionary shell game. Now you see the
money, now you don’t.
From the
seminal cronyism during the Marcos years, these shell
games morphed.
Last
week, the Trade department announced that at least P6
billion from approximately P50 billion generated from
the economic recovery through agricultural productivity
bonds would be used to capitalize a contractual
obligation originally imposed upon a private entity.
That
contractual obligation is the linking of a privately
operated commuter system with the government’s Light
Rail Transit (LRT) system.
Under
the original build-lease-transfer (BLT) covenant between
the private consortium and the government, it was
reported that the obligation to connect with the LRT was
one of the undertakings listed in the BLT agreement. To
quote the report, “The linking of the two lines should
have been undertaken by the private consortium. It was
part of the BLT contract.”
BLT
contracts are a variation of the build-operate-transfer
(BOT) paradigm under Republic Act 6957, where capital
risk is borne by private contractors as they build and
capitalize from equity or leveraged capital. As they
operate, they earn tariff revenues based on requisite
returns to private equity. Sometimes tariffs are
tempered by return-on-rate-base limits. Under this
arrangement, capital risk is borne by the private
contractor.
Under
the DTI’s proposal, the capital obligation of the
private consortium in linking with the LRT shifts back
to the government as the LRT Authority (LRTA) undertakes
what should have been the contractual responsibility of
the private consortium.
The
skinny on the scheme is for the National Development
Corp. (NDC) to dip into rural agricultural bond
proceeds, lend to the LRTA to capitalize 4.5 kilometers of urban railway linkage, and then repay when the LRTA gets
its budget allocation.
In
effect, the state virtually bails the private consortium
out of a BLT commitment it failed to fulfill. This
burdens the public for the shortcomings of the private
contractor and applies public funds to capitalize what
should be from private equity. P6 billion charged to the
public that should have been from private equity is P6
billion too much.
Worse,
the capitalization to fulfill a failed undertaking
emanates from proceeds earmarked exclusively for rural
and agricultural uses.
Under
the implementing rules and regulations of the Agri-Agra
statutes, proceeds from agricultural bonds should be
used EXCLUSIVELY FOR RURAL (our emphasis) development,
primarily for the funding of agrarian and agribusiness
projects. These include rice production joint ventures,
livestock and agriprocessing support services and
facilities, and other similar undertakings through
concessional leveraging, equity investments or other
forms of securities and issuance of guarantees.
To be
fair, statutory ambiguities allow precedents where
roadways connecting farm-to-market systems were funded
with agricultural bonds. But a 4.5-kilometer urban
overhead commuter track in the concrete metropolis is a
bit of a stretch.
Other
than the P6 billion, the Budget department is looking at
a total of P10 billion rechanneled to other projects.
But agricultural bonds are priced differently. Risks
differ from road or railway risks. Payback tenors also
differ.
Commuter
tariffs and lease payments should account for the
capitalization of the link if these were in the BLT
contract. These differences do not augur well for
whimsical re-channeling, albeit guised as transitional
debt.
Where
the agriculture sector is the most deprived, this gambit
raises a moral question. The sector’s first semester
growth has fallen to 3.5 percent from 5.4 percent.
Fiscal
prudence should step in and scrutinize these shell games
that bypass BOT bidding protocols. The sector is
bleeding enough that it can ill afford to rechannel
scarce resources. |