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TAHER
AFGHANI was working for discount retailer Target Corp.
near San Francisco when friends told him about the
riches to be made in
California’s
Mortgage Alley.
It was
2004, and the
US
real-estate market was on fire. Down in Southern
California, a hub for lenders specializing in loans to
people with weak, or subprime, credit, Afghani’s pals
were making a fortune pushing risky mortgages on
homebuyers.
After
tagging along with a buddy on a company trip to Los
Cabos, Mexico, Afghani quit Target, headed south and
began hustling loans at Costa Mesa-based Secured Funding
Corp.
“I had
never seen so much money thrown around in one weekend,”
Afghani, 27, says of the Cabo getaway. “It was crazy.
All these kids, literally 18 to 26, were loaded—the best
clothes, the cars, the girls, everything.”
Soon
Afghani, who’d made $58,000 a year managing a Target
distribution center, was pulling down $120,000.
Mortgage
salesmen like Afghani, many of them based in Orange
County, near Los Angeles, lie at the heart of the once
profitable partnership between subprime lenders and Wall
Street investment banks that’s now unraveling into
billions of dollars in losses. After years of easy
profits, a chain reaction of delinquency, default and
foreclosure has ripped through the subprime mortgage
industry, which originated $722 billion of loans last
year. Since the beginning of 2006, more than 50 US
mortgage companies have put themselves up for sale,
closed or declared bankruptcy, according to data
compiled by Bloomberg.
Lenders
such as Irvine, California-based New Century Financial
Corp.; Orange, California-based ACC Capital Holdings
Inc.; GMAC LLC’s Residential Capital home lending unit;
and General Electric Co.’s WMC Mortgage Corp. division
have slashed more than 5,000 jobs.
The
upheaval in
Orange County, home of
Disneyland and birthplace of Richard Nixon, has sent
shockwaves throughout the financial world. Brokers are
merely the first link in a chain stretching from
mortgage companies, which originate loans; to wholesale
lenders, which bundle them together; to Wall Street
banks, which package the bundles into securities; and
finally to commercial banks, hedge funds and pension
funds, which buy these investments.
The pain
has only just begun. As home prices sink and mortgage
defaults climb, bond investors who financed the US
housing boom stand to lose as much as $75 billion on
securities backed by subprime mortgages, according to
Newport Beach, California-based Pacific Investment
Management Co., which runs the world’s largest bond
fund. Companies from Detroit-based General Motors Corp.
to Zurich-based UBS
AG have
fallen into the subprime sinkhole.
At GM,
profit plunged 90 percent during the first three months
of 2007 because of mortgage losses at its 49
percent-owned GMAC finance company. Swiss banking giant
UBS said in May that it would shut its Dillon Read
Capital Management arm after the hedge fund manager lost
150 million Swiss francs ($123 million) in the first
quarter, partly on subprime investments.
Subprime
originations fell 10.3 percent to $722 billion in 2006
from a record $805 billion in 2005, according to
JPMorgan Chase & Co. Credit Suisse predicts a 40-percent
to 60-percent slide this year.
THE
party is over in
Orange County.
These days, Secured Funding’s once-buzzing office
building in
Costa Mesa,
near John Wayne Airport, is gutted. The imprint of
‘’Secured Funding’’ is all that remains of the corporate
logo that once graced the outside of the two-story
building.
Above it
is a ‘’For Lease’’ sign advertising the
7,649-square-meter building.
“They
cut way back,” a construction worker says, shrugging.
What little remains of Secured Funding is now housed in
a building across the near-empty parking lot, where a
receptionist tells a caller: “Our wholesale division is
closed. We’re no longer doing business with brokers.”
The
subprime industry—and investors’ losses—would never have
gotten so big were it not for a small army of
independent mortgage brokers and hustling salesmen like
Afghani, who was fired in October.
He and
other subprime veterans say their job was to reel in
borrowers, period. Never mind whether customers needed
loans or could manage payments. Afghani says sales
pitches typically focused on what a borrower could do
with all of that money rather than on fees buried in
paperwork or annual interest rates as high as 10.5
percent at the time, at least 2 percentage points more
than the rates that banks charge people with good
credit.
“Even
with explanations, most borrowers didn’t really
understand what types of loans they were getting,” says
Maureen Mc-Cormack, another former Secured Funding
employee. “They just cared about the monthly payment.”
The
sales job was made easier with exotic mortgages such as
so-called no-doc loans, which enable borrowers to get
loans without having to supply evidence of income or
savings, and option ARMs, adjustable-rate mortgages that
let people pick how big a payment they will make from
month to month.
The
loans offer upfront teaser rates at the cost of tacking
the deferred payments onto the balance of the loan.
“Heavy
sales pressure has been part of the most-egregious
lenders for a while,” says Kurt Eggert, a professor at
Chapman University School of Law in Orange, California,
who has studied the role of aggressive sales tactics in
subprime lending and sued lenders on behalf of elderly
borrowers caught up in home equity scams.
However
brokers snared customers, lenders in California
typically sold the loans to big banks or Wall Street
firms. Under US law, investors who buy mortgages or
securities backed by them are typically not susceptible
to lawsuits alleging fraud on the part of brokers.
Such
protection partly explains why the US
mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) market has ballooned.
The market more than tripled since 2000; $2.4 trillion
of MBSs were issued last year, according to the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association in
New York.
Last year was the first time more than half of the
securities issued were backed by subprime and other
nonconforming loans, according to the trade group. “The
market is driven by volume and passing along the risks
associated with it,” says Paul Leonard, director of the
California office of the Center for Responsible Lending,
a Durham, North Carolina-based consumer advocacy group.
“With the appetite of the secondary market, neither
brokers nor originators had much accountability.”
Lenders
push sales of subprime loans as far down the chain as
possible to vast networks of brokers. While independent
brokers account for about half of all mortgage
originations, they handle as much as 70 percent of
subprime originations, according to the Mortgage Bankers
Association of America. Many of the biggest subprime
casualties, including Santa Monica, California-based
Fremont General Corp.; Kansas City, Missouri-based
NovaStar Financial Inc.; and New Century Financial,
would never have grown as fast as they did without their
ability to outsource the bulk of their sales to outside
brokers and salesmen. New Century, before tumbling into
bankruptcy on April 2, used a network of 47,000 mortgage
brokers and 222 branch offices to grow to $59.8 billion
in annual loans last year from just $400 million in its
first year, in 1996, according to company filings.
Even
before the bottom fell out of the subprime market,
NovaStar and other lenders were defending themselves
against lawsuits that accused the companies of using
independent brokers and branch salesmen to exploit
borrowers with high-cost loans. A lawsuit filed against
Nova-Star in federal court in Memphis, Tennessee, in
April 2006, for example, centers on allegations that
NovaStar used mortgage brokers to prey on minority
borrowers, in this case a 61-year-old black woman who
claims to have heard pitches for “easy money” on a local
gospel radio station.
Among
other allegations, the plaintiff, Mae Jackson of
Memphis, claims she was never informed about the terms
of the loan, including the amount, the interest rate or
the closing costs. In her complaint, she attacks
NovaStar’s practice of using mortgage brokers who employ
“deceptive high-pressure tactics to foist these unfair
and discriminatory subprime loans onto unsuspecting
minority borrowers.”
In court
filings, NovaStar pins the blame on the mortgage broker,
Memphis-based Worldwide Mortgage Corp., which filed for
bankruptcy in April 2006. In a separate statement,
NovaStar says that contrary to the plaintiff’s portrayal
of herself as naive, Jackson was a “real-estate investor
who owned five properties at the same time.” Neither she
nor her attorneys have provided any evidence of
discrimination, NovaStar says. Jackson couldn’t be
reached for comment.
Like
many subprime lenders, NovaStar spread its tentacles by
tapping into a broad base of mortgage brokers and
so-called net branches. A net branch enables an
independent broker to set up shop under Nova-Star’s or
some other company’s banner with little upfront
investment, much less a state license, and quickly begin
brokering loans to kick upstream to the parent.
NovaStar
made great use of the technique: By the end of 2004, it
had expanded its number of branches to 432 from four at
the beginning of 2000. At their peak in 2003, NovaStar’s
branches brought in $1.2 billion of loans, a fifth of
the total $6 billion in subprime loans originated by the
company that year. “The branches represent a competitive
advantage for NovaStar as we seek greater market share,”
the company said in its 2003 annual report.
Several
lawsuits filed against Nova-Star paint a more sinister
picture. They claim the company played fast and loose
with state licensing requirements in an effort to make
results look better than they might have without the aid
of the branch loan sales. “NovaStar had woefully failed
to comply with federal and state regulations as a result
of defendants’ efforts to expand the company’s business
at all costs,” alleges one 94-page complaint filed in
November 2004 in federal court in Kansas City and
certified as a class action this past February.
The firm
is facing at least seven class actions, according to
Bloomberg data. Among other allegations, the
Kansas City
lawsuit claims NovaStar fraudulently puffed up
borrowers’ assets to qualify customers for loans. One
unnamed former employee, identified as a “loan officer”
who worked in California from 2002 to 2003, told
plaintiffs’ lawyers that employees would apply an “XActo
knife and some tape” to borrowers’ W-2 forms and
paychecks to qualify them for loans. The same employee
said that on other occasions, the company would
temporarily deposit $5,000 in the bank account of a
potential borrower to inflate his or her assets.
NovaStar
would either take the money back or increase the loan
fees, according to the lawsuit filed by co-counsel
Milberg Weiss & Bershad LLP of New York. “NovaStar
believes it is irresponsible to continue to print
the
false and inflammatory allegations regarding lending
activities contained in this lawsuit, given that the
plaintiffs have never produced any evidence to support
them and they are not actually a part of the underlying
claim,” NovaStar spokesman Richard Johnson said in a
statement.
Johnson
says three state and federal licensing and compliance
actions involving the branches filed against NovaStar
that are detailed in the lawsuit amount to much ado
about nothing. “None of NovaStar’s operations in these
states, or nationwide, were materially affected or in
danger of being materially affected, in any way, and
therefore those actions did not require disclosure at
the time,” Johnson said in his statement. The company
announced in April it was exploring “a range of
strategic alternatives,” including a sale.
MANY
subprime sales techniques are now spilling out in the
lawsuits, advocacy reports and Congressional hearings
that predictably follow such industry meltdowns. Several
lawsuits illustrate the lengths to which the big
wholesalers, and ultimately Wall Street, were able to
outsource the selling of the loans as far down the chain
as possible. Fremont General’s Fremont Investment &
Loan, Wells Fargo & Co.’s home mortgage unit and a
rogue’s gallery of mortgage brokers come under such
scrutiny in a lawsuit filed in August 2006 in San Mateo
County, California, state court.
Plaintiff Johnnie Damon claims he was “fraudulently
induced” to take out a $484,000 loan from Irvine-based
mortgage broker Peak Funding Inc., which allegedly
falsified Damon’s financial records to qualify him for
the loan. Damon claims he asked for a reverse mortgage,
which enables homeowners to borrow money in the form of
payments charged against their home equity, and instead
got a “traditional refinance loan” without his
knowledge.
Also
without Damon’s knowledge, the claim says, the mortgage
broker falsified information on his loan application,
such as his monthly income, to qualify him for the loan.
Fremont sold servicing rights on the loan, which is the
right to process monthly payments, to San
Francisco-based Wells Fargo and flipped the loan itself
to Paris-based Société Générale SA.
Wells
Fargo is also named as a defendant for ignoring
“fraudulent and predatory lending practices” in the
loans it purchases and services, according to the
lawsuit.
The
complaint also alleges that
Fremont,
prior to its recent decision to exit the subprime
business, was using mortgage brokers to do its dirty
work. “Fremont has a history of intentionally turning a
blind eye to fraudulent and predatory lending practices
by the mortgage brokers who generate home loans for the
company,” the lawsuit alleges without citing any other
specific examples. Expanding on the accusations, Damon’s
attorney, Aaron Myers of Howrey LLP, says Fremont funded
a loan made “by a bunch of crooks who completely misled
the borrower, falsified his income, coerced him into the
loan and then tricked him into sending the loan proceeds
back to the company.”
In
answers to the complaint, all of the defendants deny the
accusations. “Wells Fargo’s trivial role in this case is
punctuated by the fact that it has not caused the
plaintiff any harm,” Wells Fargo’s attorneys said in an
October 10, 2006, court filing, adding that they put a
hold on the loan after the dispute erupted. “Wells Fargo
does not belong in this case.”
Robert
Cannone, a former chief financial officer and director
of Peak Funding who’s also listed as a defendant by
name, says the firm closed last October after it ran out
of money. He neither admits nor denies wrongdoing.
“I’m so
embarrassed,” Cannone says in a telephone interview. “I
feel really bad.”
He says
that of the 100 loans made by Peak, this is the only one
in dispute. He says an employee connected with the Damon
loan “went off the reservation.”
When the
boom went bust, even people on the periphery of the
industry got caught in the downdraft. Carrie Feinman
worked in Scottsdale, Arizona, in the wholesale prime
lending division of New Century Financial, which
acquired nonsubprime loans from smaller lenders and
mortgage brokers. The relative health of her side of the
business, which New Century acquired from Royal Bank of
Canada in 2005, couldn’t stop New Century’s troubled
subprime lending from dragging the entire company into
Chapter 11 on April 2.
Feinman
says the news that the company was filing for bankruptcy
came out of the blue, leaving her and most other
employees out of pocket on unused vacation time and
severance pay. “We were shocked,” says
Feinman,
who’s looking for a job. “If I had quit the week before,
I would have gotten my vacation time. You wonder why no
one is loyal to employers anymore.”
A MONTH
after leaving Secured Funding, Afghani took a new job at
Irvine-based Solstice Capital Group Inc., another
subprime lender. HSBC, the same bank that had been
buying loans from Secured Funding, bought Solstice last
year for $50 million.
Afghani
quit in April, vowing to find a new line of work.
“Enough is enough,” he says, adding the good times are
long gone.
“I’m so
rock bottom I had to move out of my apartment in Irvine
and live rent free with my girlfriend,” he says.
The hard
knocks have taught him a lesson, Afghani says. “It was
tough love and agreat learning experience to live within
your means and not end up like the individuals on the
other side of the phone,” he says. |