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The
Indian authorities may have finally become serious about
mopping up unwarranted liquidity in the banking system.
With
yesterday’s announcement of a 50-basis-point increase in
the ratio of deposits that lenders have to keep with the
central bank as unremunerated reserves, the call-money
rate may now rise from the 0.17-percent level it fell to
last week.
Overnight rates hovering near zero in an economy that’s
growing at a 9-percent annual pace, and where inflation
may be simmering just beneath the surface?
That
wasn’t just ridiculous; it was plain dangerous.
Had it
gone on for some more time, bankers would have judged
the excess liquidity to have become permanent.
Part of
it would have then been funneled into the overheated
property market, jeopardizing the central bank’s efforts
to slow down mortgage demand.
Banks
are itching to cut home-loan rates, which have risen two
percentage points this year because of monetary
tightening. Already, high borrowing costs are pushing up
delinquencies in unsecured personal loans that are
usually the first ones to witness defaults by households
with stretched mortgages.
If banks
cut lending rates prematurely, credit growth may pick up
speed again. Inflation, which accelerated to a six-week
high in the week to July 14, may not be tamed without
raising interest rates. Although an eighth quarter-point
increase in the policy rate since October 2005 may not
derail corporate investment growth, it would still be
entirely
unnecessary.
The
liquidity glut has been caused by foreign inflows that
haven’t been “sterilized,” or absorbed by the central
bank.
Insufficient absorption
US
dollars brought into the country by foreign investors
and local corporate borrowers have been bought by the
central bank to keep the local currency from rising. In
the first five months of the year, such purchases
amounted to $23.5 billion. But the rupee funds released
into the banking system in the process haven’t been
neutralized by bond sales.
In a
July 16 note to investors, Peter Redward and Puay Yeong
Goh, economists at Barclays Capital in
Singapore,
estimated that less than a third of the foreign inflow
into India in the second quarter was sterilized.
Since
June 8, the figure has plunged to just 9 percent, the
Barclays economists said.
Every
hedge-fund manager investing in India knows the
near-zero rates will have to rise. And they are betting
that they will rise through an appreciation of the
exchange rate: The central bank will simply have to stop
buying dollars, so that it has less domestic money to
mop up.
The
sloshing liquidity has thus become a lightning rod for
currency speculators, who are emboldened by a renewed
interest among investors to allocate capital to India
funds.
Budget
deficit
More
overseas money heading into Indian equities will push
the Reserve Bank to choose between keeping the exchange
rate steady (by buying dollars), or controlling
inflation (by not buying dollars).
The only
way the Reserve Bank can control both inflation and the
exchange rate for any length of time is if the
government is willing to take a hit on its budget. Even
on that count, there seems to be a lack of urgency. The
Finance Ministry has imposed a limit of 1.1 trillion
rupees ($27 billion) on the total stock of bonds and
bills the central bank can sell.
This is
inadequate and must be increased to at least 1.5
trillion rupees, say Redward and Goh. Since the
government will have to pay interest on these bonds, it
is hesitant. But without the central bank possessing the
ammunition to sterilize every rupee of liquidity
released by every dollar purchased, it can never make
the currency speculators go away.
Too many
constraints
The
authorities want high growth, low inflation and a
stable—preferably undervalued—currency. And they don’t
want to pay for it explicitly.
Into the
bargain, what has been allowed to drift is liquidity.
The
overnight index swap, which has a floating interest rate
tied to call-money levels, fell more than two percentage
points between April 27 and July 23.
The
increase announced yesterday in the cash-reserve ratio
will help mop up liquidity in the short term.
It is,
however, neither a permanent fix, nor a free lunch:
Preemption of bank deposits by the central bank acts as
a tax on the banking system and erodes its
competitiveness.
No end
to volatility
Overnight adjustment of banking-system liquidity doesn’t
quite work in India.
When
money is loose, just like now, the central bank is loath
to drain the lot overnight because of the obligation to
pay 6 percent on these funds. So it decided in March to
limit its daily borrowings to 30 billion rupees. That
ceiling on absorption will now be scrapped, the Reserve
Bank said yesterday.
When
liquidity in the system becomes tight, a different
limitation kicks in: Banks aren’t able to borrow from
the Reserve Bank even if they are willing to pay the
asking rate of 7.75 percent because of a shortage of
collateral.
That’s
because they have to set aside 25 percent of their
deposits in “statutory liquidity,” or government
securities that don’t qualify as collateral.
With all
these constraints, an end to the volatility in the
overnight rates isn’t in sight. Excess liquidity may
disappear, reappear, or turn into a drought. Banks will
simply have to live with not knowing which of the three
it might be tomorrow.
Andy Mukherjee is a Bloomberg News columnist. The
opinions expressed are his own. |