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(Note: Congressman Locsin, a Harvard-trained lawyer and
at one time presidential counsel and speechwriter of
President Corazon C. Aquino, was one of those asked by
the Supreme Court to deliver a paper at the National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and
Enforced Disappearances—Searching for Solutions, July
16-17).
IMAGINE
a situation where killings and disappearances are taking
place. The victims form a distinct and disliked, though
by no means unpopular political grouping. In fact, they
have the most populist agenda of any other. The victims
are not prominent members of their persuasion. They are
not even zealous militants or even militants at all.
They are mere rank and file; social workers in short.
The crimes show a pattern pointing to security agents as
the perpetrators. More than a pattern, it is the
conclusion of a presidential commission. The authorities
are reluctant to investigate the murders and
disappearances. More, the authorities are openly
dismissive of the problem. Gratuitously, yet with a
knowing air, they deny the crimes are taking place. Yet,
contradictorily, they blame the crimes they deny are
taking place at all on the victims themselves, adding
that in a sense the victims have only themselves to
blame for adhering to a cause detested by the military.
“They are begging for it” is heard from their lips. And
yet the Constitution that covers both victims and
suspects protects freedom of belief without any
distinction; the last distinction having been erased by
the repeal of the antisubversion law.
Alabama
in the 1960s? No. US President Johnson sent in US
marshals to protect the victims and enforce their
rights. The hypothetical situation might well be the
Philippines today under a government that, out of
complicity with or fear of the perpetrators, will do
nothing, leaving only a newly elected Congress, already
too absorbed in its forthcoming perks to pay back the
cost of its recent election, to take any serious notice
let alone action. Leaving a Court anxious not to say
alarmed but constrained by the passive role to which
judicial tradition and the constitutional text confine
it.
The
Court wishes to do more regarding a situation that does
not yet amount to an actual controversy because one of
the parties is missing and the other party denies having
anything to do with it, occasionally expressing doubt
the other party really is missing. And it is logically
impossible to prove a negative.
But
there are mothers crying for missing children, children
who were once there and are no more. The Court wishes to
do more; hence this Judicial Summit. The Court desires
to expand the reach of existing rules, or promulgate new
ones, for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights.
To that
end, the Court wishes to revisit the rules of evidence
such as hearsay, circumstantial, forensic and the like.
These are well within the Court’s competence, since it
promulgates the rules. It wishes to review as well
policies and rules governing the conduct of police
investigations. These are arguably executive in
character though neglected in police practice. It seeks
to explore more remedies for aggrieved parties than the
writ of habeas corpus, in a situation where the corpus,
so to speak, cannot be had from authorities who deny
having it; and where persistence in the search might
ironically be rewarded with the permanent disappearance
of the victim.
Congress
is asked to provide its inputs on the situation that has
led to this crisis in our justice system, where killings
and enforced disappearances have been traced by a
presidential commission to state security agents, and
perpetrated with complete impunity and such disregard
for constitutional safeguards as to invite grave doubt
that we live under a rule of law. If we supposedly live
under a rule of law but the principal laws are not
systematically left unenforced in key cases by those
principally charged to enforce them, why have the
Supreme Court at all? The Nazi courts are said to have
had a near fine record in purely commercial cases,
unmarred even by anti-Semitism since all the Jews had
already been relocated. These Nazi precedents may still
be standing and, if not openly cited, nonetheless
consulted for their illumination on commercial and civil
laws. Precedents from Japanese Imperial courts are
deeply respected. Yet neither society, more vibrant and
coherent even than the democratic ones that succeeded
them, is yet deemed to have had a genuine rule of law or
judicial system.
Strictly
speaking, this is not a problem for the passive
receptacles of cases, as the Court modestly describes
the judicial function—when and if, that is, the
executive brings them before the courts. But the problem
is precisely an executive that sits on its hands and
thereby stains them with these crimes. As a result, by
the Court’s own initiative, the weakest and least
dangerous branch of government must pit itself against
the most powerful and lethal; the circumspect power of
deliberation against the brazen power of the sword, with
the petty power of the purse counting pennies on the
side.
To be
brutally honest, Congress can have no fruitful role to
play in this dilemma, if it were expected simply to
craft more new legislation to curb violations of
constitutional rights. From where I sit, thickening the
thicket of legislation may confer a passing comfort for
the small shade that the shrubs may give, but it will
not result in the smallest progress in addressing the
utter disregard of such legal safeguards as the
Constitution and past congresses have already put in
place.
Adding
more will not help. As the saying goes, there is no
problem so big you can’t turn your back on it. Even
congressional threats, which are forthcoming only where
perks are in peril, won’t help. The Constitution
mandates the automatic reenactment of the previous
budget in a stalemate. Congressional investigations
would help if they were competently conducted and
mentally honest, and executive officials cooperated, as
they have not done with or without E.O. 464. And
contempt is out of the question where the tenures of
Speaker and Senate President would be at risk.
What
seems to be doable is for the judiciary to be quicker
and more aggressive in addressing human rights cases
even under existing rules where legal standing and
actual controversy exist. Give the executive no leeway
to tell the families of the victims, “So sue us and see
how far that gets you.” A recent Court of Appeals
decision shows how far. Or rule quickly and with
finality—as the Court just did after almost a year—on
the validity of the arrest and detention of Leftist
lawmakers; and use the occasion of its ruling to express
in the strongest terms the Court’s uneasiness if not
alarm over the human rights situation in the country.
There is a limit to circumspection and the Court can, in
practical terms, really, do no wrong.
In
short, strike down offensive executive actions as fast
as they are correctly protested—I emphasize the
qualifier “correctly”—and the executive will get the
message and the citizenry, feeling reassured that
effective recourse lies somewhere, will be further
emboldened to do what is firstly their responsibility
and not the Court’s: stand up for their rights. That
will answer the criticism from the groups representing
the victims that to protest is to step forward and hang
around with a bulls-eye painted on one’s chest.
Besides,
if the Court became aggressive, on whom would discredit
fall if the Court’s orders are ignored—the Court which
makes no pretense of power or the executive which
willfully neglects to use its power as the Constitution
mandates? Lincoln’s assumption of the presidency did
pose a distinct danger to a US Supreme Court that had
favored the slave power. But this is not a
Lincoln
presidency nor is this country one so divided between
two sincere and equally strong convictions about a
universal but coarse democracy encompassing all colors
and conditions, or a refined but limited polity.
Would
the Executive retaliate? Any way it attempts to, it will
invite the withdrawal of society’s support. Would
Congress retaliate? I submit it will not, out of
indifference to the issue and the individual member’s
respect for the future utility of the Court in their own
cases. Congressmen would rather stay friends with the
justices, that sorry excuse of an impeachment of a
previous chief justice notwithstanding.
In fact,
we can expect Congress to view the crisis of government
as yet another opportunity—like the two failed
impeachments, the last of which was based on seven boxes
of old newspapers and obsolete COCs—where are those
boxes now by the way?—to feather nests as both Senate
and House did.
In fact,
impeachment will only put the executive more firmly
under the heel of the military that stands between it
and its fear of the mob, thereby driving the executive
authority firmly into the assassins’ fold.
Indeed,
setting aside all cases—as Justice Denning says in
Due Process of Law is regularly done—so as to deal
swiftly and aggressively with those involving the
curtailment of basic rights and liberties would signal
all concerned that the Court is prepared to use all the
tools in its legal arsenal, and exploit every
opportunity for judicial activism to uphold those rights
and liberties and the rule of law itself without which
the judicial function will be reduced to the formal
condemnation of the victims of tyranny and the
validation of oppression as happened during Martial Law.
The judicial function loses its principal purpose when
the rule of law for all serious intents and purposes
ceases to operate except in the comparatively trivial
matter of commercial cases.
In this
regard, I invite the Court’s attention to the literature
on the judicial activism of the Israeli Supreme Court
which has established constitutional norms where none
existed —such as freedom of expression, press,
association and public assembly, as well as equality
regardless of Palestinian race and religion; going to
the extent, according to a paper by Ariel Bendor, of
enforcing good government. Even in cases of national
security, the
Israel Court
has proscribed coercion and torture and the detention of
a Muslim community in negotiating the release of Israeli
hostages. “The policy of the [Israeli] Supreme Court in
the sphere of [legal] standing and justiciability [is]
based on giving preference to the rule of law;” i.e.,
the need to protect and preserve the rule of law itself
“as opposed to the institutional interest of the court”
to steer clear of political issues that invite
retaliation from the political branches of government.
“This is because without judicial imposition of the
law,” says Bendor, “the law would not be upheld” at all.
Bendor
seems to be of the view that where key laws are ignored,
a passive court should take an extended vacation. While
it sits it implicitly legitimizes the grossest
illegalities.
Furthermore, Bendor argues that the doctrines of legal
standing and justiciability are not really meant to
foreclose judicial intervention even in cases involving
national security. They exist merely to give, initially,
the upper hand to the political authorities. We do this
ourselves with the presumption of the regularity of
official action.
Congress’s role in all this, it seems, is limited but
not nonexistent. When the occasion arises, Congress can
pass resolutions supporting the Court’s activism. Or
not.
To be
sure, the Melo Commission Report recommends some
legislative initiatives: such as the creation of a
single investigative body, civilian in composition and
independent of the military and the police, with its own
budget, and tasked to look into and prosecute complaints
against uniformed personnel. Appointments, however, are
an executive prerogative and retired military suspects
or those who can be depended on to be afraid of them
will be the most likely nominees.
The Melo
Commission Report recommends a special law for strict
chain-of-command responsibility in the military and
police with respect to “extrajudicial killings and other
offenses committed by personnel under their command,
control or authority.” But this begs the question
whether these crimes will be seriously investigated and
prosecuted in the first place so as to put in judicial
jeopardy even mere triggermen let alone those who gave
or hinted the orders. Only then can an enhanced
conception of command responsibility kick in.
Whether
it’s Court or Congress or even the Executive—to be fair,
it is the only one to seriously tackle the issue by
constituting the misunderstood Melo Commission—any
serious attempt to address the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances must be anchored on
the key findings of that commission, whose report is
complete, comprehensive and fair despite the boycott of
its proceedings by the side of the victims.
In
brief, these are its highlights:
There is
an epidemic of extrajudicial killings of activists to an
extent sufficient to cry for the special attention of
concerned authorities. The numbers are alarming, despite
the variance (a low of 111, according to the usual
suspects, and a high of 724, according to the victimized
sector), but more alarming is the impunity with which
they are carried out.
Along
the same lines, UN Rapporteur Philip Alston said that
the dispute about the actual numbers isn’t what’s
important because “the impact of even a limited number
of killings of the type alleged is corrosive in many
ways. It intimidates vast numbers of civil society
actors, it sends a message of vulnerability to all but
the most well-connected, and it severely undermines the
political discourse which is central to a resolution of
the problems confronting this country.” The threat has
crept even to the well-connected as shown by the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos into a vehicle traced to
the military.
In other
words, these killings are not part of a decapitation
strategy—which would be just as wrong—aimed at the
insurgent leadership. They are deliberately random to
create an atmosphere of terror that will preempt
membership in, not to mention activism by the Left;
instilling terror at the mere thought of either option.
Not surprisingly, a Jesuit priest, in a paper submitted
to the National Defense College, encourages a freer hand
for the military in addressing what the author sees as
the aggravated freedom of belief that was spawned by
President Fidel V. Ramos’s injudicious repeal of the
Anti-Subversion Act. In other words, the way to address
the root of rebellion is to make it painfully, not to
say excruciatingly unthinkable to even ponder that
option. Alston’s observation echoes that of the Sabato
Commission investigating the Argentine Dirty War; that
it was the small who were particularly targeted. If you
can die painfully for even a minor infraction, would you
even dream of serious political action? The dispute over
body counts recalls why Albert Camus would not debate
Sartre on the issue of which side, the Left or the
Right, killed more and for better reasons: the arguments
must consist of hurling corpses at each other.
The Melo
Commission Report concluded not only that militant
activists are the obvious targets but “it should be
carefully noted that the victims…were all noncombatants.
They were not killed in armed clashes or engagements
with the military.” In short, they were assassinated,
usually in the same fashion—killers on
motorbikes—proving the poverty of the military
imagination.
Indeed,
the Melo Commission Report went on, circumstantial
evidence indicates that “a certain group in the
military, certainly not the whole military organization,
is responsible for the killings. To maintain otherwise
would be closing one’s eyes to reality.” Indeed, General
Palparan, the poster boy of the anti-insurgency
campaign, told the Melo Commission “that he had no
reason to believe that the killings were perpetrated by
the CPP/NPA.”
If the
Leftists are not doing it to themselves, who is? The
signs are abundant, says the Melo Commission Report,
that General Palparan had actively encouraged the men
under him, in at least three areas where he was assigned
as field commander, to “neutralize” activists tagged as
“enemies of the state”—a category that does not exist in
law, conventions of warfare or articles of war. To be
sure, he denied ordering any killings but granted that
he may have inspired the triggermen. Congress reacted by
swiftly confirming his promotion in time for his
long-awaited retirement. Congress truly has no role in
addressing the problem except to step aside.
The Melo
Commission pointedly recommends General Palparan’s
prosecution on command responsibility: either for not
stopping his men from carrying out the killings or for
encouraging a climate conducive to their commission. So
as not to deny dubious credit where it is due, Palparan
would not categorically deny, in a House of
Representatives hearing, that under his command there
are special teams operating at night, wearing bonnets,
or masks, with the apparent mission of extrajudicial
elimination of so-called enemies of the state.
Apparently, he feared the prospect of perjury more than
murder.
But it
is not General Palparan alone who has created a climate
conducive to extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. For many years now, the Executive and
the Armed Forces leadership have failed to establish
clear parameters for fighting insurgency while upholding
constitutional rights—and where parameters existed,
confusing rather than clarifying them.
In
September 1992, around the anniversary of Martial Law of
which he was an architect, President Fidel V. Ramos
signed the law he had actively encouraged Congress to
pass, repealing the anti-subversion act (RA 1700), thus
making communism legal in the Philippines. The incumbent
president, then a senator, supported the repeal. Showing
she understood its import, she said on August 22, 2002,
that while certain groups still adhere to the communist
cause, they had nothing to fear from the law so long as
they do not have armed components. To be more precise,
they were safe so long as they did not take up arms
against the government. “What is abhorred and proscribed
is the use of armed struggle to attain political ends,”
her Press Secretary underscored.
So far,
so clear, it is not rocket science. Soldiers in the
field understand it even if, lately, they feign
confusion because their officers say that, since there
are many legal ways by which peaceful groups can legally
help criminals like the NPA, what is the difference
between that and aiding and abetting and adhering to the
enemy. The difference is this: the first is essence of
the political process we have been encouraging the Left
to join; the second is treason which is possible only in
a time of war against a foreign enemy.
Aiding
and abetting this contrived confusion, the Palace issued
Executive Order 546 on July 14, 2006, as the spate of
assassinations that the Melo Commission has traced to
the military was attaining exuberant proportions. EO 546
returns the police to military direction, for the
express purpose of reinvigorating the military’s
anti-insurgency campaign; thereby resurrecting in
operational terms the quasi-military Philippine
Constabulary that the new Constitution had extinguished
in law. While the Constitution forbids criminalizing any
organization and proscribes guilt by association, EO 546
appears to create the category of “enemy of the state”
whom government may hunt down with every resource at its
command. This explains the paralysis that suddenly
afflicted the PNP’s Task Force Usig after announcing
progress in the investigation of the Jonas Burgos
abduction, possibly implicating the 56th Infantry
Battalion in Norzagaray, Bulacan.
The Melo
Report concluded: “By declaring persons enemies of the
state, and in effect, adjudging them—by decree without
trial, I might add—guilty of crimes, these persons have
arrogated unto themselves the power of the courts and of
the executive branch of government.”
In other
words, EO 546 is effectively a bill of attainder and the
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
inspired thereby show that the executive branch is
already operating a parliamentary system—not the modern
version but the same kind as impeached, attainted and
executed the Earl of Strafford in the ill-fated reign of
Charles I.
In
conclusion, while Congress could well adopt more laws to
expand the power of the Court to prosecute human rights
violations with greater effect, one should not hold
one’s breath. The first and last resort of Congress is
its power to do nothing until the problem is buried with
the last activist. Congressmen like to think that
professing a fierce anticommunism will improve the
chances of getting US visas for their maids.
Beyond
the need to restore a comprehensive rule of law which
transcends the usual limitations on the judicial process
of legal standing and justiciability, there is this too
to consider. Quoting Brandeis the Melo Commission Report
concluded, “crime is contagious” and allowing government
to break the law at will invites anarchy and
retribution. If one starts shooting enemies out of hand,
they may start shooting back. In sum, a congressional
contribution to the Judicial Summit cannot improve on
the Nike advertisement in advising the Court on this
matter: Just do it. |