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HONOLULU—The
rapid spread of product development and research in
high-technology industries toward the Asia-Pacific
Region is accelerating China’s rise as an economic
superpower. As
China sucks in billions of foreign direct investment, a
significant chunk of which are poured into research and
development facilities, it has become the third-most
important offshore R&D location after the
US and
the UK as early as 2005.
Economist Dieter Ernst, a research fellow at the
East-West Center in Honolulu, cites China as among the
major beneficiaries of a phenomenon he calls “innovation
offshoring” or the internationalization of product
development and research. This trend, he says, is being
“driven by profound changes in corporate innovation
management, as well as by the globalization of markets
for technology and knowledge workers,” with American,
Japanese and European companies at the forefront.
Among
the companies that have set up R&D centers in China are
technology icons like Microsoft Corp., International
Business Machines Corp., Hewlett-Packard Co., Oracle
Corp., Siemens AG, Sun Microsystems Inc., Toshiba Corp.,
Intel Corp. and Nokia Oyj.
Among
the attractions for these companies is the huge pool of
cheap talent in China. For instance, a microchip
designer in China gets paid only about $28,000 a year,
compared with annual salaries of $300,000 in Silicon
Valley in the US, $150,000 in Canada, $75,000 in
Ireland, $65,000 in South Korea, $60,000 in Taiwan and
$30,000 in India.
In line
with this offshoring trend is the increasing
sophistication and rapid growth of local technology
firms.

Case in
point is Chinese high-tech enterprise Huawei
Technologies Co. Ltd., whose R&D facility in
Shanghai
showcases the company’s breakthroughs in mobile,
broadband, Internet protocol-based, and optical
networks; terminals; and telecommunications value-added
services.
With
total sales reaching $11 billion in 2006, Huawei is
currently serving 31 of the world’s top 50 telecom
operators like Vodafone Group Plc, Telefonica SA,
Deutsche Telekom AG, and BT Group Plc, covering more
than a billion subscribers.
Ross Gan,
Huawei’s corporate communications officer, says the
company has expanded its reach worldwide providing
third-generation telecommunications solutions. Huawei,
she boasts, has become among the top three suppliers in
global emerging markets, accounting for 13.7 percent of
the Commonwealth of Independent States, 28 percent of
the
Middle East and North Africa,
26 percent of
South Africa,
8 percent of Asia-Pacific, and 10 percent of Latin
America.
As of
end-March, Huawei had won 50 UMTS—universal mobile
telecommunications system—commercial contracts, adds Gan.
Almost
half of Huawei’s 62,000 employees are engaged in R&D. It
spends a tenth of its revenues in a dozen research
facilities around the world, including the United
States, Sweden, Russia and India. The results? Huawei
has applied for 19,187 patents as of December 2006 of
which 2,742 have been approved, Gan says.
Huawei
is just one of an increasing number of technology firms
that are making their mark in global business. Earlier
Chinese computer maker Lenovo Group Ltd. vaulted into
the scene when it bought IBM’s PC business.
Just
looking at the mushrooming of high-technology start-ups
in China financed by American venture capital,
accompanied by a continuous circulation of skilled
engineers from Silicon Valley into China’s technology
parks, and the unstoppable strength of its
export-oriented economy, one could understand how the
world has viewed China’s rise as inevitable.
“China
will be a major economic, political and military
superpower—a colossus,” declares Christopher McNally, a
research fellow at the
East-West
Center,
who specializes on the China and the Asia-Pacific.
“Never has the world seen such an important political
economy rise within such a short time span with such
global influence.”
The
China debate
Still,
the rise of
China
as a global power has been greeted by two contrasting
perspectives.
On one
hand are those who are alarmed by what they see as a
looming Chinese threat, which is poised to challenge the
United States for global leadership. Those who ascribe
to this view, especially the more hawkish Americans, see
China as similar to the old Soviet Union—another “evil
empire”—as it seeks to establish “a rival political,
economic and cultural system that will inevitably come
into conflict with that dominated by the United States,”
McNally explains.
Then
there are those who consider China as a more benign
power. “China aspires to develop into a world power.
However, she will not develop like other rising powers
before in history and for the time being will go along
the status quo,” McNally says. “Its rise will not go
through any major war or protracted Cold War
confrontation with other great powers.”
Instead,
China is expected to act more as a “responsible
stakeholder” that would properly integrate a more
powerful economy into the global system.
McNally,
however, believes neither of these contrasting
perspectives adequately captures the deeper issues
surrounding China’s rise.
“These
perspectives at best misconstrue the dynamics of China’s
rise and are at worst dangerous to our understanding of
what exactly China’s rise will entail,” he says.
Viewing
China as threat, he says, is dangerous as this may lead
exactly to the situation it’s trying to prophesy. But at
the same time, the more peaceful view “does not also
incorporate an even-handed view of the inexorable
quandaries of China’s rise.”
“Even
the ‘responsible stakeholder’ concept glosses over the
fundamental dilemma of how the existing power structure
accommodates a rising China,” McNally adds.
Transitions in power
History
has shown that the rise of new powers has always been
associated with conflict with the dominant society or
nation of that period, as seen in the rise and fall of
the old European empires to the most recent collapse of
the Soviet bloc.
Such
transitions in power have taken place every 50 to 100
years and these are “usually dangerous periods,” says
Mohan Malik, an expert on China and professor at the
Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, based in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
“Power
transition theory holds that competition and/or conflict
is likely when a dominant great power is threatened by
the rapid growth of a rival’s capabilities, which
reduces the difference in their power,” he explains.
That may
be already happening, as seen in the increasing
conflicts between China and its major trading partners,
notably with Europe and the US, both of which have
complained about China’s weak currency that has largely
contributed to China’s ballooning trade surpluses. There
are also persistent complaints about China’s ineffectual
intellectual property rights laws, the dominant role of
state-owned companies in the Chinese economy, abusive
labor rights, as well as environmental policies.
But
McNally cautions that there are several uncertainties
within China’s system that would affect its rise as a
global power.
For one,
China’s political transition, he points out, is still
incomplete and it’s probable that its development path
wouldn’t be similar to those of advanced capitalist
powers like the European Union, the US or Japan. “It
doesn’t have sufficient legal and institutional
certainty, the state remains dominant over subservient
capital, and the middle class is embryonic,” cites
McNally.
Moreover, China lacks a “constitutional state” as
indicated by the lack of a relatively autonomous legal
system and enforcement, as well as autonomous
professional bodies for corporate leaders, journalists,
accountants, lawyers and the like. As such, China has a
“political economy in transition that has not reached
the institutional certainty and predictability of
advanced industrial economies,” he says, noting that
while the Communist Party binds the system in China, “it
also forestalls fundamental reforms.”
“In
other words, if
China’s
present political economy is sustained, it implies a
state-sponsored form of capitalism. On China’s scale,
this could prove to be highly destabilizing for the
global capitalist system,” says McNally. “Policy
conflicts will increasingly dominate China’s
international trade, investment and economic relations.”
Much
closer to home is
China’s
evolving regional relationships, particularly over
Taiwan,
which it considers a renegade province, as well as
competing territorial claims with Japan.
McNally
considers
Taiwan
as a potential “tipping point” in the geopolitical
rivalry pitting Japan and the US against China and “any
change in the status quo will have reverberations in
Southeast Asia, the
Korean
Peninsula and beyond.”
McNally
also notes that
China
has no free and open access to the sea lanes of
communications, including the Strait of Malacca, and the
Sunda and Lombok Straits where 80 percent of its oil
pass through. These sea lanes are practically under the
control of the Americans such that
China
has been building its naval capability to address this
handicap.
It has
also adopted a “string of pearls strategy” to ensure its
1.3 billion people wouldn’t run out of oil. These
“pearls” include Bangladesh, where a container port
facility in Chittagong is being established; Myanmar,
where China has naval bases and electronic listening
facilities in the Bay of Bengal close to Malacca
Straits; Cambodia, where it is helping in building a
railway line from southern China to the sea; and
Thailand, where China is considering the funding of a
$20-billion canal across Kra isthmus that would allow
Chinese ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca.
“China
seems to be doing everything simultaneously in a much
more condensed time frame,” said McNally. “In fact,
China’s emergent capitalism combines aspects of crude
Victorian capitalism with 21st-century technology and
corporate organization… As with the rise of other great
powers before it, China’s rise will be disruptive and
difficult for the international system to absorb.”
Cold War
residue
But for
the Chinese, much of the jitters surrounding China’s
ascent in the corridors of international power are
caused by an overestimation of China’s capabilities and
global ambitions.
After
all, it has other problems to attend to.
Liu
Xielin, a professor at the Management School of Graduate
University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, for one,
insists China would not exert much influence on its
neighbors because “domestic affairs will be more
important for the Chinese government in the coming
years.”
“It will
take long time for the Chinese side to challenge the
power of the US,” he says.
Chen
Weihua, chief commentator of China Daily, a national
English-language newspaper in China, dismisses Western
concerns about China as paranoia and a residue of Cold
War mentality. While China will carry increasing
economic weight globally, Chen concedes that its
political clout will be stymied by a “crippled political
system” due to absence of political reforms and basic
freedoms.
Instead
he sees a benign
China
that will serve more as an engine of growth in the
Asia-Pacific through greater intraregional trade and
investments.
“It is
true that with the current government, China has become
more assertive and involved in international affairs and
China’s increased integration with the rest of the world
makes this not just necessary, but important,” Chen
says, noting that China and the US and other Western
countries differ in handling crises, whether it is Iraq
or North Korea, Iran or Cuba.
“China
will make its voice heard more clearly in the future as
it becomes strong. [But] it serves China’s interest
best to be at peace with the rest of the world. We still
have to fight hard to lift many people out of poverty,”
he adds.
As China
evolves into a more globalized society, Chen says the
country would be steered into “a direction more
compatible with the rest of the world.”
“It will
not serve
China’s
interest to be a disruptive force,” he says. “It serves
China’s interest to have countries in the region as our
friends and good neighbors, including Taiwan and Japan.
People here want stability.” |