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Earlier
this year, someone was confident that Hydril Co.’s stock
was due to take flight—and very soon. During the two
days ended on Friday, February 9, investors purchased
options conveying the right, through February 16, to buy
more than 160,000 Hydril shares for $90 apiece.
It was
the first time anyone had invested in that particular
option. On its face, the wager looked like a long shot:
The Houston-based oil-drilling-equipment maker’s stock
fell 2.3 percent that Friday to $83.04 and had never
topped $90. The shares would have to rise almost 9
percent in a week before anyone could make money by
exercising the options.
The bet
paid off almost instantly. Before the sun was up on
Monday, February 12, Luxembourg-based Tenaris SA
announced it was buying Hydril for $97 a share. By day’s
end, Hydril stock jumped to $95.24. The $90 options that
traded at 50 cents on Friday soared to $5.30, for a
one-day gain of 960 percent.
During
this year’s record-setting rush of corporate takeovers,
a surge of well-timed investments in Hydril and other
acquisition targets has triggered insider trading alarms
at the US Securities and Exchange Commission and stock
exchanges around the world.
As
regulators follow the money from suspicious trades,
they’re discovering a number of trails are leading
straight to Wall Street investment banks.
“One of
the things that is particularly disturbing to me is the
number of Wall Street professionals that are engaged in
insider trading,” says Linda Thomsen, director of the
SEC’s enforcement division. “It is frankly outrageous.”
Since
April 2006, the SEC has filed insider trading-related
lawsuits against more than a dozen investment bankers,
analysts and executives whose jobs require them to
safeguard clients’ secrets. That’s a higher number of
cases than during the entire decade of the 1990s.
At least
another dozen recent complaints involved brokers and
traders. The defendants come from Credit Suisse Group,
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co. and Morgan
Stanley.
Sworn to
secrecy
TWENTY
years after the 1987 film Wall Street popularized
the catchphrase “Greed is good,” the new wave of insider
trading cases suggests that the ends-justify-the-means
ethos that gripped Wall Street in the 1980s has
returned.
“For a
lot of these people, if you look at what they’re making
in terms of salary and bonus, there’s no other way to
view it except as being greedy and a view that you’re
above the law,” says Robert Marchman, NYSE Regulation
Inc.’s executive vice president for market surveillance.
Premerger trading that appears too timely to be dumb
luck has tainted dozens of takeovers, according to
securities trading data and SEC filings. After buyouts
are announced, US companies typically submit documents
to regulators that pinpoint key dates during their
confidential negotiations.
In many
recent cases, prices for stocks, options or credit
default swaps jumped conspicuously at those turning
points, when all participants were supposedly sworn to
secrecy.
Since
the buyout boom of the 1980s, investment alternatives
have flourished, offering unprecedented outlets for
insider trading in the 21st century. A sprawling,
secretive market for credit default swaps, which are
wagers on the likelihood a company will default on its
debt, has more than doubled in size during each of the
past three years.
At the
end of 2006, almost $35 trillion worth of the swaps were
outstanding, up from $3.8 trillion in 2003, according to
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.
Trading
in equity options—which let investors buy or sell stock
at predetermined prices for fixed periods—has quintupled
on the Chicago Board Options Exchange in the past 25
years.
Because
options are much cheaper than actual shares,
suspiciously well-timed investments before buyouts, such
as Hydril’s, can turn big profits from small outlays of
cash.
SEC
files suits
CASES
filed this year by the SEC and US Justice Department
show how brazen these alleged insider traders have
become. Credit Suisse Group investment banker Hafiz
Naseem was arrested on May 3 in New York on federal
criminal charges that he tipped off a friend ahead of
time to nine imminent takeovers involving Credit Suisse
clients.
Among
them was Hydril’s $2-billion acquisition by Tenaris.
Naseem, 37, denied wrongdoing and is free on a
$1-million bond.
Ajaz
Rahim, an investment banker at Faysal Bank Ltd. in
Karachi, Pakistan, was charged by US prosecutors on May
29 with making a $5-million profit in one trading day
from options and stock purchased with advance word about
the $45-billion offer for Dallas-based utility owner TXU
Corp. from Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and TPG Inc.
Rahim
was given the tip by Naseem, prosecutors allege. Rahim’s
lawyer, Spencer Barasch, a partner at Andrews Kurth Llp
in Dallas, says the banker plans to contest the charges.
On May
8, the SEC froze brokerage accounts owned by a Hong Kong
couple it accused of turning an $8-million profit on Dow
Jones & Co. shares after getting wind of News Corp.’s
$5-billion offer for the publisher of the Wall Street
Journal.
The SEC
says in a civil suit that Kan King Wong and Charlotte Ka
On Wong Leung spent $15 million—as much as $12 million
of it borrowed—in an 18-day buying binge that accounted
for more than 3 percent of all Dow Jones trading during
that time. A lawyer for Wong and Leung, Michele Hirshman
of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison Llp in
New York,
declined to comment.
Opportunities go up
LIKE the
scandal that brought down merger speculator Ivan Boesky
two decades ago, the alleged misuse of market-moving
secrets has developed alongside a frenzy of big-money
mergers. That’s not an accident, says Stephen Luparello,
NASD’s senior executive vice president for regulatory
operations.
“Whenever the market picks up for buyouts and mergers
and acquisitions, you see the opportunities for insider
trading go up,” he says. Boesky was among the
most-prominent Wall Street arbitrageurs, known
colloquially as “arbs,” who tried to invest in likely
takeover targets to reap the run-up in share prices when
acquisitions were announced.
Global
acquisitions announced this year totaled $2.8 trillion
through June 13, on pace to top 2006’s all-time high of
$3.5 trillion. Much of the merger mania is fueled by
cash-flush private equity firms, which accounted for
nine of this year’s 15 biggest acquisitions of US
companies through June 11.
Many
leveraged buyouts are mounted by partnerships made up of
two or more firms, multiplying the roster of bidders,
investment bankers, lenders and lawyers privy to
hush-hush negotiations.
“With a
friendly acquisition, it greatly expands the universe of
people who have access to material nonpublic
information, and as the pool of people expands, the
possibilities for inappropriate use of the information
increase,” Marchman says.
The TXU
bid, for example, involved seven investment banks and 12
law firms, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The
purchase by KKR and TPG, formerly known as Texas Pacific
Group, is expected to close by the end of this year.
What’s
more, when public companies attract interest from
would-be acquirers, they often sound out other potential
buyers or conduct confidential auctions in search of
better prices, further swelling the circle of those in
the know.
“How
many people can you have knowing a secret and keep it a
secret?” asks John Coffee, a securities law expert at
Columbia University in New York. “Under about 10 people,
I think Wall Street can keep a secret. But much beyond
that, I don’t know.”
The
stain of possible insider trading is tarnishing
acquisitions big and small, from the TXU bid, which
would be history’s biggest leveraged buyout, to the
$30-million purchase of First Federal Bancshares Inc., a
bank with $340 million in assets based in Colchester, a
town of 1,500 in west-central Illinois.
Suspicious trading in TXU options started three business
days before the February 26 announcement that KKR and
TPG planned to buy TXU for $69.25 a share. On February
21, when TXU stock fell almost 2 percent to $56.07,
investors began flocking to an option to buy TXU shares
for $60 apiece.
The
trading volume for the options soared to almost 25 times
the average amount since it first traded, and on
February 23, it exceeded 100 times the average. Those
options, which cost as little as 20 cents on February
21, closed at $8 on the day of the takeover news—as much
as a 3,900-percent gain.
“That
pretty much screamed that something was up, that
somebody knew something,” says Michael McCarty, an
options trader who tracks unexplained moves in the
options market at Meridian Equity Partners in New York.
“That was pretty egregious.”
Almost
overnight, profits on some TXU options were so
eye-popping that within four days of the takeover
announcement, SEC lawyers won a federal court order
freezing accounts holding $5.3 million of alleged
ill-gotten gains from trades originating in Frankfurt,
London and
Zurich.
Stock
trading also showed signs of suspicious timing before
recent mergers. In the weeks after First Federal’s board
met on September 20 to consider offers from two
potential buyers, the bank holding company’s shares
vaulted as much as 33 percent to an 18-month high of
$24.
The jump
complicated the directors’ decision about selling the
company: The highest bid was $23 a share, which had
seemed like a handsome premium when the stock traded for
$18.
“It was
the board of directors’ belief that the increase in the
price of the stock most likely reflected speculation of
a merger and not an actual increase in the intrinsic
value of FFBI,” the company’s January 12 merger proxy
said.
On
November 6, First Federal accepted the $23 offer by
Heartland Bancorp. Shares fell on the news to $22.60
from $22.75.
Dramatic
consequences
AS
regulators search for the sources of inside information,
they say any whiff of Wall Street culpability prompts
priority scrutiny. “Where you’ve got somebody in the
industry that’s involved, those always get raised right
to the top of the pile,” Luparello says.
Bankers
who go bad and are caught likely face prison terms, on
top of fines and forfeiture of ill-gotten gains from SEC
civil lawsuits, says Thomsen, 53, a 12-year veteran of
the SEC’s enforcement division who led the agency’s
probe of Enron Corp.
Dennis
Levine, a Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. mergers specialist
charged in 1986 with tipping Boesky to confidential
information, was jailed for almost a year and a half.
James McDermott, former chief executive of Keefe,
Bruyette & Woods Inc., spent five months behind bars in
2000 and 2001 for passing takeover secrets to a Canadian
adult film actress.
Earlier
this year, former Merrill Lynch analyst Stanislav
Shpigelman was sentenced to 37 months in prison after
pleading guilty to leaking advance word of mergers
involving the firm’s clients.
“Criminal prosecutors will not hesitate to pursue
insider trading when it’s done by professionals,”
Thomsen says. “People need to be reminded that there are
dramatic consequences for this.”
Former
Morgan Stanley compliance officer Randi Collotta cried
in a Manhattan federal courtroom on May 10 as she and
her husband pleaded guilty to securities fraud and
conspiracy. Prosecutors charged that Collotta, 30,
alerted a stockbroker friend about secret merger talks
by Morgan Stanley investment banking clients.
As a
compliance officer, Collotta was supposed to make sure
other Morgan Stanley employees obeyed rules safeguarding
confidential information.
Later
the same day, in the same
New York
courthouse, US attorney Michael Garcia brought charges
against former Morgan Stanley vice president Jennifer
Wang and her husband, former ING Investment Management
analyst Ruben Chen. Wang, 31, and Chen, 34, face four
felony charges alleging they traded on information Wang
learned about merger negotiations.
They
plan to plead innocent, says their lawyer David Spears
of Spears & Imes Llp in New York.
Global
trading
SIGNS
that insiders are profiting from confidential
information are visible around the globe.
The UK
Financial Services Authority said in a March report that
insider trading may have sullied one-quarter of
Britain’s announced takeovers in 2005. Last year,
unusual trading preceded 33 of 52 Canadian takeovers
valued at more than $188 million, according to
Toronto-based research firm Measuredmarkets Inc.
Timely
premerger investments don’t always turn out to be
illicit. Through research into company financial
statements and takeover trends, savvy investors may
identify likely buyout targets without access to
nonpublic information, Thomsen says.
“There
could be rumor or speculation that is not borne of
material nonpublic information,” she says. Sometimes,
innocent investors get lucky.
Still,
SEC merger filings show that unusual trading in many
transactions has been so closely tied to closed-door
developments that it defies coincidence.
On
December 7, after Redback Networks Inc. got a
$25-a-share takeover offer from Ericsson AB, Redback’s
bankers at UBS AG told Ericsson that the Internet router
manufacturer wanted talks to proceed as quickly as
possible to cut the risk of leaks, according to a
December 22 regulatory filing. Redback’s shares soon
showed signs the secret was out.
On
December 14, one day after Ericsson’s lawyers delivered
a draft merger agreement, Redback’s stock jumped 12.3
percent on almost four times its average trading volume
for the previous three months. From Ericsson’s initial
bid on December 1 to the disclosure of the deal on
December 19, Redback shares skyrocketed almost 46
percent to $21.17 from $14.52. The 184-member Nasdaq
Telecommunications Index rose 3 percent.
While
Redback’s board saw the stock price rise, company
directors couldn’t do anything, says Paul Giordano, who
was Redback’s nonexecutive chairman before the takeover.
“We
noticed it,” says Giordano, CEO of Tamalpais Asset
Management Lp in Sausalito, California. “The markets are
going to do what the markets are going to do. All you
can do is act in the best interests of your
shareholders.”
New
generation
THE
recent rush of suspicious trading comes 21 years after
Wall Street was rocked by the SEC’s May 1986 suit
against Drexel Burnham’s Levine, then a 33-year-old
investment banker. Levine led authorities to Boesky, who
agreed to pay $100 million to settle the SEC’s case.
By the
time it was all over, Drexel Burnham was defunct and
Levine, Boesky and Drexel Burnham junk bond head Michael
Milken were behind bars.
Those
cases seemed to suppress the allure of insider trading
for brokers and bankers. During the first half of the
1990s, the SEC’s enforcement division filed no cases
against Wall Street professionals.
From
1995 to 1999, the SEC’s enforcement watchdogs sued 10
investment bankers, analysts and compliance officers for
trading on nonpublic information.
The
cluster of SEC insider trading cases on Wall Street
since last year may mean a new generation of bankers and
brokers is too young to remember Boesky and Milken, says
Harvey Pitt, who was SEC chairman from 2001 to 2003.
“The
investment banking business is a young man’s and young
woman’s business, and some of these people weren’t
around in the 1980s,” says Pitt, who now runs Kalorama
Partners Llc, a Washington consulting firm.
Former
Morgan Stanley compliance officer Collotta, who was nine
years old in 1986, was among 11 people sued by the SEC
in March, including five employees of Bear Stearns Cos.
and UBS who were 31 to 41 years old. The group made more
than $15 million over at least five years from tips
about mergers and analyst rating changes, the government
alleged.
In
fighting insider trading, the first line of defense
includes surveillance units at the SEC, NYSE, NASD and
US options markets. They use computers to sift through
millions of daily trades, looking for statistical
oddities, such as abrupt changes in price or volume.
Investigators can later crosscheck trades with other
databases, such as chronologies of merger negotiations
and lists of people who knew about the talks. Current
probes are focusing on traders, not companies.
To
impose sanctions, regulators must find out who made the
trades and prove the traders had access to company
secrets. “The hard part is drilling down to find
particular individuals who have particular bits of
information that is both material and nonpublic and not
gotten from some other source,” Thomsen says.
Suspicious gains may be obvious when made by stock
market neophytes. Illicit trading can be less
conspicuous when done by hedge funds and other big
investors who routinely buy and sell stocks in dozens of
companies. “The hedge fund is sophisticated; it doesn’t
stand out,” Columbia’s Coffee says.
Under
the radar
INSIDER
trading by professionals is a cat-and-mouse game, Pitt
says. “People who plan these trades are many things:
They’re evil, they’re cheaters, but they’re not usually
stupid,” he says. “So they figure out how they’re going
to try to mask what they’re doing.”
Burgeoning swaps and options markets can help wily
scofflaws avoid detection, Luparello says. “More
sophisticated players have more tools,” he says. “When
it comes to catching insider trading, it makes it harder
and harder because they can be working in the option,
they can be working in the equity, they can be doing a
swap over the counter.”
Increasingly, prices for credit default swaps are
soaring in tandem with supposedly secret merger talks,
according to Bloomberg data.
Swaps
prices represent the annual cost of contracts that
guarantee repayment of the principal on corporate bonds
if a company defaults. In day-to-day trading, that cost
rises if investors think a company has a greater risk of
missing payments.
When
multibillion-dollar takeovers are financed with new
debt, the jump in credit default swap prices may far
outstrip gains in the target company’s stock.
Suspicious trades of credit default swaps aren’t as
easily spotted as stock or option investments. Most
swaps are bought and sold in privately negotiated deals.
Trading isn’t tracked by market surveillance systems,
and there’s no central database of transactions.
Former
swaps trader Frank Partnoy, now a law professor at the
University of San Diego, says the unregulated swaps are
a magnet for illegal insider trading. “Only a moron
would engage in plain-vanilla insider trading,” he says.
“If you’re smart, you do it under the radar.”
When
speculators with illegal inside information drive up
prices, the victims are investors who sell without
knowing that a bigger potential windfall is just over
the horizon, says James Cox, a securities fraud expert
at Duke University Law School in Durham, North Carolina.
“Retail
investors, and maybe even some sophisticated investors,
when there’s an anticipated run-up in the price, may be
selling, thinking it’s good news,” he says.
Regulators are pursuing cases against investment bankers
at a time when sanctions for insider trading are tougher
than ever. The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley law boosted maximum
penalties to 20 years behind bars and a $5-million fine
from 10 years and $1 million.
Still,
some Wall Street professionals are convinced they’re too
clever to be captured, says David Steiner, NYSE
Regulation’s vice president of market surveillance
division.
“The
main deterrent for this type of activity, and this type
of individual, is the possibility of getting caught,
with the loss of standing in their job and in their
community,” Steiner says.
With
round-the-clock international markets and new kinds of
investments to exploit for illicit insider gains,
cunning profiteers are looking for ways to stay one step
ahead of the law. “While the government has proved it
can catch some of those people, I’m not sure they’re
catching most,” Coffee says.
Until
the risk of getting caught exceeds the certainty of
getting rich, the new flow of merger-linked insider
trading is likely to keep bubbling along. |