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SECTION
5.2 of Republic Act (RA) 8799 (Securities Regulation
Code of 2000) does not qualify the Security and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) jurisdiction when it mandates that it
“shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving
intracorporate disputes submitted for final resolution,
which should be resolved within one year from the
enactment of this Code.” It is worthy to note that prior
to the effectivity of RA 8799, the SEC had been
exercising the power to execute its decisions over all
intracorporate cases in the exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 902-A (Capitol
College of Iligan Inc. v. Commission on Audit (CA) GR
128941, January 28, 1999, 302 SCRA 349)
It has
been repeatedly held that a case in which an execution
has been issued is considered as still “pending” so that
all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the
suit. (Mondejar v. Javellana, GR 116883, September 22,
1998, 295 SCRA 699, 712, citing Balais v. Velasco, GR
118491, January 31, 1996, 252 SCRA 707, 721). Even
assuming that a “decided” case pending execution can no
longer be considered as “pending,” it is settled that
the particular words, clauses and phrases in a law
should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce a harmonious whole (Yamaoka v.
Pescarich Manufacturing Corp., GR 146079, July 20, 2001,
361 SCRA 672, 680, citing National Tobacco
Administration v. Commission on Audit, GR 119385, August
5, 1999, 311 SCRA 755, 769).
In this
situation, the word “pending” defines the phrase “cases
submitted for final resolution” at the time the law took
effect. Simply put, the reckoning point to determine
whether a case is retained with the SEC for being a
“pending case submitted for final resolution” is RA
8799’s date of effectivity. Otherwise, it would be
revolting to the common sense to direct the SEC to
resolve said cases within one year from the enactment of
the Code. Having retained its jurisdiction over the
instant case pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA 8799, the SEC
must be deemed to have the power to execute its subject
decision. A long-standing doctrine is that the tribunal,
which rendered the decision or award has a general
supervisory control over the process of its execution,
and this includes the power to determine every question
of fact and law, which may be involved in the execution
(Mondejar v. Javellana, supra note 39, citing Vda. de
Paman v. Señeris, L-37632, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 709).
Note
that the word “resolve” does not include “execute” is
likewise futile. A fair reading of the law will show
that the SEC was merely directed to render its decisions
in the retained intracorporate cases within one year
from the enactment of the Code. The word “should” is
“the past tense of shall, ordinarily implying duty or
obligation, although usually no more than an obligation
of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation,
thereby distinguishing it from ‘ought.’”(Black’s Law
Dictionary, 6th edition). Said directive cannot be
stretched to mean that the SEC’s jurisdiction over the
retained intracorporate cases has been limited to
decision-making.
Since
jurisdiction over said category of cases has been
retained by the SEC, the one-year period from the
enactment of the law within which the cases should be
resolved was more of a directive to the SEC to hasten
the resolution of the cases. A contrary holding results
in absurdity, for—assuming that the cases were not
resolved after the one-year period and the effect was
that the SEC would lose jurisdiction over the
cases—there would then be no court or body that could
resolve the cases since jurisdiction over them was not
transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
This
construction is consistent with the legislative intent
in the enactment of RA 8799, The Securities Regulation
Code. The excerpt of congressional deliberations cited
in the assailed CA decision reveals the unmistakable
intent for said category of intracorporate cases to
remain with the SEC. Another excerpt of the
deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
the Securities Act of 2000 confirms the intent for the
SEC to finish the pending cases involving intracorporate
disputes already submitted for final resolution. This
must be deemed as including the power to execute as
“execution is the fruit and end of the suit, and is very
aptly called the life of the law.” (Garcia v. Echiverri,
L-44455, October 23, 1984, 132 SCRA 631, 639, citing
Carreon v. Buissan, L-41875, March 12, 1976, 70 SCRA
57).
We
further take light from the presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and courts are not to give words a meaning which
would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences (Millares
v. NLRC, G.R. 110524, July 29, 2002, 385 SCRA 306, 316
and Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Securities and
Exchange Commission, et. al., GR 165382, August 17,
2006).
From the
foregoing it can be finally resolved that the close to
583 cases that were left “pending” at the SEC at the
time of its full reorganization by the effectivity of RA
8799 in 2000, will remain to be totally “decided” and
ended even if their intracorporate nature would normally
situate them within the jurisdiction of the RTC. |