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In the
late 1980s, scientists for New York City-based drug maker
Pfizer began testing what was then known as compound
UK-92,480 for the treatment of angina. Although UK-92,480
seemed promising in the lab and in animal tests, the
compound showed little benefit in clinical trials in
humans.
Looking at
these negative results, some firms might have thrown in
the towel and moved on to other projects. But Pfizer’s
scientists picked up on—and decided to pursue—what they
thought might be an interesting side effect. That side
effect resulted in a historic windfall for the drug maker
soon after it began marketing UK-92,480 under the brand
name Viagra.
Pfizer was
able to develop and launch a wildly successful and
profitable new drug because it effectively managed the
false negatives—ultimately incorrect indications of
failure—of the innovation process. Companies can implement
the following practices to spot them and manage them.
1. REVIEW
ALL CANCELED PROJECTS.
An effective starting point is to review all canceled
projects a second time six to 12 months after they have
been terminated. Has anything changed, either within the
project itself or within the larger environment, that
might warrant reconsideration of the earlier decision?
2. EXPOSE
PROJECTS TO OUTSIDERS.
If a project isn’t moving ahead inside the company, maybe
someone outside the company can think of something to do
with it.
IBM took
an approach along these lines with a particular software
project that did not seem to have any potential. Once the
project was sidelined, IBM decided to publish it on its
AlphaWorks web site, where outsiders could examine and
download various IBM software. Soon thereafter, IBM
managers noticed that this particular piece of software
code was being downloaded at a rate 10 times that of other
code posted at the site. We know it today as the XML
(extensible markup language) parser.
3. SEEK
EXTERNAL LICENSES.
Through
external licensing, projects that aren’t being used
internally might unlock additional revenues on the
outside. Procter & Gamble (P&G) follows this path as part
of its “Connect and Develop” strategy. According to P&G
policy, any technology that is not being used by one of
its businesses within three years of its patent date is
automatically made available for license to
others—including competitors. P&G businesses now know that
if they don’t use a technology, they might lose it to a
competitor instead. This likely forces a more careful
consideration of new P&G technologies when they become
available.
4. SPIN
TECHNOLOGIES OFF.
Lucent
Technologies—now Alcatel-Lucent—created its New Ventures
Group (NVG) to launch new ventures that would
commercialize technologies judged not to be valuable
internally within Bell Labs. The NVG team looked for
promising technologies that weren’t getting to market
through Lucent’s own businesses. When they identified one,
they first offered it back to Lucent’s businesses. Only
those projects turned down by the businesses were then
pursued as new ventures.
Lucent’s
businesses had to make their decisions carefully, because
if they didn’t choose to use a technology, they might lose
it to a new venture. NVG initiated 35 ventures out of Bell
Labs from 1996 through 2001. Many of these went out of
business, a few became valuable and three of them were
later reacquired by Lucent.
Having
three out of 35 projects turn out to be “positives” is not
a bad track record for Lucent’s businesses. If Lucent had
not had NVG as part of its process, though, the
information created by these ventures once they got
started would never have emerged.
5. SEEK
EXTERNAL VC PARTNERS.
Venture
capitalists offer another interesting option for ideas
that have been rejected internally. VCs are adept at
crafting business models for emerging technologies, and
they can experiment with nascent technologies in emerging
markets far more effectively than can most large
organizations.
This
approach also offers several options for the company that
originated the idea: It can participate as an investor, as
a customer, as a supplier or simply as an interested
bystander. If and when some real value is created, the
company can step in by licensing the technology or
acquiring the new venture company.
6. IF YOU
CAN’T PREDICT, LEARN HOW TO REACT.
When
commercializing a new technology requires the resolution
of both technical and market uncertainty, one cannot
expect to be able to anticipate the best path forward from
the very beginning.
Measurement errors are inescapable in such situations.
Rather than ignoring them, companies should initiate
processes to cope with these errors. This increases their
chances of finding a highly valued use for the technology.
The
history of innovation is full of examples where the
eventual best use of a new product or technology was far
different from its initial intended purpose. Companies
need to manage false negatives in their innovation
processes and respond accordingly.
***Henry
Chesbrough is the executive director of the Center for
Open Innovation at the Haas School of Business at the
University of California at Berkeley and is the author of
Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and
Profiting from Technology.
****
THE
HIDDEN VALUE OF FALSE NEGATIVES
By their
very nature, false negatives are tricky to spot in
advance. Xerox created a number of false negatives out of
its Palo Alto Research Center lab. When it didn’t see the
results it sought, Xerox terminated further funding for
projects that we know today as Ethernet (by 3Com) and
PostScript (by Adobe).
These
projects were evaluated within Xerox and judged not to
warrant further internal spending because the company
didn’t see a market for the technology. It also lacked the
necessary practices for recognizing and coping with false
negatives. Of the rejected projects that started inside
Xerox’s labs from 1979 through 1998, 11 of 35 were spun
out to the external environment with no Xerox involvement
and eventually became very valuable. |