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This is
a situation where the propriety of the appointment of an
Interim Management Committee prior to the enactment of
Republic Act 8799 (Securities Regulation Code) was the
subject of a petition for review on certiorari. The case
sought to set aside a January 2002 decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the July 2000 Order of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which
sustained the SEC’s hearing officer appointing the
Interim Management Committee.
The
salient facts of the case are as follows: Mr. A, in his
capacity as director and minority stockholder of X
Corp., instituted a derivative suit before the SEC
against Mr. B and Mr. C, officers of X Corp. Mr. A
argues that Mr. B and Mr. C committed company plunder
when they raided X Corp.’s coffers and diverted a
multimillion-peso amount to various corporations
(hereinafter referred to as B’s Group of Companies)
where B is a substantial stakeholder, as well as to
companies affiliated with X Corp. Mr. A prayed that Mr.
A and Mr. B be ordered to account for and return the
diverted amount to X corporation and that in the
interim, a management committee be appointed to end the
dissipation, wastage and loss of corporate funds.
In 1999,
after both parties have submitted their respective
evidence, the SEC Hearing Officer (SEC-HO) then issued
an order creating an Interim Management Committee (IMC)
to oversee the administration of X Corp. pending
resolution of the dispute. The hearing officer explained
that the massive diversion of funds and the constant
bickering among the stockholders demanded the immediate
creation of a management committee pendente lite. Then
after the a motion for reconsideration was denied, Mr. B
and Mr. C filed a petition for review raising the same
issues to the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the
decision of the SEC thus Mr. B and Mr. C brought the
assailed findings of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court on petition for certiorari.
The
Supreme Court ruled that the appointment of the IMC was
fully warranted by the circumstances. The findings of
the SEC-HO support the conclusion that there was
imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of corporate assets. The word “imminent” has
been defined as “impending or on the point of
happening,” while “danger” means “peril or exposure to
loss or injury.” The findings of X Corp.’s external
auditor support the conclusion the Mr. A and Mr. B’s
unrestricted and continuous management of the
corporation did pose an impending peril to corporate
assets.
In
addition, as admitted by the parties the prevailing
internal dispute and feud between the parties had
resulted in the total paralization of X Corp.’s business
operations and adversely affected its collection
efforts. In view of these facts, the SEC-HO was clearly
justified in ordering the appointment of the IMC to
oversee the operation of X Corp. and preserve its assets
pending resolution of the parties’ dispute.
With
regard to Mr. B and Mr. C’s argument that the
appointment of the IMC caused them injuries, which far
outweigh the benefits granted to Mr. A, suffice it to
state that a management committee is not the
representative or agent of the stockholder upon whose
instance the committee has been appointed rather, it is
for the time being a ministerial officer and
representative of the court that is hearing the
derivative suit. The Supreme Court further elaborated
that since the appointment of the management committee
is for the benefit of all interested parties, it holds
and manages the property for the benefit of those
ultimately entitled to, and not primarily for the
benefit of the party at whose instance the appointment
has been made. This writer believes that this is the
most compelling argument in favor of the position that
the SEC retains this power to constitute an IMC even
after the enactment of R.A. 8799.
In fine,
it cannot be denied that the circumstances obtaining in
this case demonstrate quite clearly the need for the
immediate appointment of a management committee. The
competence of the hearing officer to issue the
questioned order is fully warranted by law and the
protestations of Mr. B and Mr. C thereto are groundless
and illusory (Jacinto and Colayco vs. First Women Credit
Corp. G.R. 154049 August 1, 2006).
Today,
the debate continues and the jury is still out on
whether the powers of the SEC to appoint a management
committee for the same urgent reasons stated in the
afore-discussed case, still hold or if these powers have
all been transferred to the Regional Trial Courts (RTC).
This writer holds the view that the SEC still has those
powers although these may be exercised concurrent with
the RTC. |