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IT’S a
shade too insensitive to say that there must be a silver
lining in that powerful cyclone that flattened villages
in the key rice-producing Irrawaddy delta in Burma—or
Myanmar—at the weekend, leaving a death toll of at least
15,000 people, per latest accounts, but still rising.
And yet,
in that tragedy the people of
Southeast Asia may yet find anew their common soul as they reach out
to each other in these times of crisis; first marked by
the soaring prices of rice that is a staple for their
peoples, and now, this natural disaster in
Burma.
Only a
few days ago, Burma had served notice it was willing to
join a proposed cartel of rice-exporting members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), led by
chief proponent Thailand, sparking howls of protest and
friendly reminders from the rice importers in the
regional bloc—like the Philippines—that fretted, both
over the impact of this setup (rice, like oil in Opec,
could then rise to even more stratospheric rates) and
the dismaying sense of being treated just like any
ordinary customer by your supposedly good neighbors.
And then
Nargis struck, and things changed.
On
Tuesday the head of the Thai rice exporters held out the
possibility that rice-exporting
Burma
may be forced to import rice this year after crops were
wiped out by Nargis, “potentially adding further
pressure to global food supplies as prices gain,” as a
Bloomberg account put it.
The
cyclone, billed as possibly
Southeast Asia’s deadliest natural disaster since the 2004 tsunami, had
come just as rice futures in
Chicago
rose to a record last month. This, after some exporters
like Vietnam served notice they would limit shipments,
even as demand gained. Vietnam and the other exporters
had said their first priority was to stabilize supply in
their own constituencies before considering good
neighborliness; and the 12-year inflation high of over
20 percent in that Southeast Asian country in April had
prompted some analysts to say it would keep curbing
shipments in response to the price increases.
According to Bloomberg, quoting Mr. Chookiat Ophaswongse
of the Thai rice exporters’ group, Burma would probably
have exported about 400,000 metric tons (A “tentative”
April forecast from the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization even has it higher at 500,000 mt) of rice
this year because of soaring prices, up from normal
shipments of less than 100,000 tons. The storm is thus
seen to “jeopardize” exports.
With
rice, the staple food for half the world, surging more
than 90 percent over the past year—touching a record
$25.07 per 100 pounds on the Chicago Board of Trade on
April 24, says Bloomberg—Thailand, the world’s largest
rice exporter, would have continued to make a killing.
Especially considering that the same factors that caused
the price surge were seen to continue—the extreme
weather in many countries affecting crops and crimping
supply, the rising demand overall for rice, and the
global food-price surges partly because of the shifts in
farm use for biofuels instead of food.
But
then, as we stated at the start of this editorial,
sometimes good things emerge from the worst of times. On
Tuesday Thailand declared it was dropping plans to
create the Southeast Asian rice cartel that would have,
à la Opec, fixed the price of rice over concerns of food
security.
The
proposal to create the cartel was raised by Thai Prime
Minister Samak Sundaravej in order to, per a Bloomberg
report, give rice producers greater control over rice
prices that tripled since December. The concept was shot
down by Filipino senators, including Sen. Edgardo Angara,
who heads the agriculture committee, as well as some
Thai rice exporters.
On
Tuesday the tide had changed. “We are not talking about
setting up a rice cartel,” Foreign Minister Noppadon
Pattama was quoted as saying after meeting ambassadors
from six rice-exporting countries in Asia. “If Thailand
sets up a rice cartel and fixes a price, that will make
matters worse and worsen food security.”
As an
alternative,
Thailand
proposed holding a meeting on rice in the next couple of
months—one that engages such top Asian exporters as
India, China, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Pakistan on
issues of productivity. Here at home, that same theme,
i.e., focusing once and for all on productivity and rice
self-sufficiency, had been the same tack taken by the
Executive after critics pilloried her administration’s
policy of unbridled rice importation just because it was
deemed cheaper to buy from the world market than growing
it locally.
The
exporting countries, per Thailand’s latest concept,
would then just discuss the sharing of technology,
market information and price information.
The Thai
foreign minister, replying to a question, was quoted as
having said, “We are sympathetic to all human beings,
not just the Filipinos,” who complained the loudest
about the rice cartel.
Whatever
it is that caused the Thai turnaround, the good point in
this is that Asean members are now appreciating the
wisdom of having the regional bloc. Beyond the
officialese, the Southeast Asians are seeing the human
face of tragedy and suffering, and, while responding to
their own national interests, are nonetheless
instinctively responding to the calls for help from
those in dire need, be they Burmese or Filipinos.
While
they are at it, the Asean members, meanwhile, would do
well to keep prodding their counterparts in the Burmese
junta to provide the outside world an honest,
comprehensive picture of the real situation in that
benighted land. A regime that has thrived for decades on
suppressing information both into and out of its
borders, while repressing its own people, doesn’t
inspire confidence that it will level with outsiders
seeking to help the victims of Nargis.
For the
longest time, the Asean has failed to prove that its
policy of engaging the junta if Burma were a member will
yield more effective results than if Burma were an
outsider. In this crisis, Asean members may yet find the
means to pressure that repressive regime to finally do
right by its own people. Virtual slavery in
multibillion-dollar projects that enriched only the
military elite, schools closed for decades, starvation
wages, no democratic space—these had formed part of the
junta legacy way before Nargis struck. The man-made
disaster had long preceded the natural, and in this
confluence of events, the Asean may yet find that good
neighborliness entails knowing the difference between
simple humanitarian aid and prompting change for the
long-term good. |