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ONE
would think that at the Bureau of Customs (BOC), one of
its most potent powers would be its prosecutorial
prerogative and faculties. Unfortunately that is not the
case. At least, not entirely. Structural dilutions and
an endemic, albeit persistent, culture where
near-autonomous arms and legs operate independently
under their own powers tend to weaken what efforts are
expended to catch criminals and smugglers.
What
energies the BOC has, what enforcement capacities are
invested on this most important revenue-generating
office, are organizationally adulterated and thinned out
among its various appendages. Blame, finger-pointing and
innuendo thus ricochet everywhere, often hitting only
those who are visible and proximate. The real crooks who
pander agency favors remain insulated, hidden under
protective skirts and shadow benefactors. While there
are a few valid arguments for legal decentralization,
there are just as many perils—and perhaps even more—for
an agency where prosecutorial focus, hustle and
determination are critical.
Recently, to depict political resolve, an enforcement
and policing agency was created away from the BOC. Now,
the BOC’s virtual adulteration includes externalities
not within its organic structure but under a political
office, belligerent and aggressive, albeit detached,
from the BOC’s legal core.
There
are ups and downs where political will is spread out by
such organizational construction. Task forces employing
police powers are temporary fixes. That has its
advantages as it infuses testosterone and tenacity into
the efforts to catch smugglers and cheats. On the
downside, however, it requires a keener sense of
management and organizational competence, control and
coordination with the legal center of the BOC where both
brainpower and fiscal responsibilities reside.
Its
speckled past and its tendency to attract political
criticism render it fashionable to criticize the BOC and
its legal team. Where revenue shortfalls result from
aggressive deterrence; where the greater the efforts to
prevent criminality, the less is gained peso-wise, BOC’s
self-cleaning aspects are easily prone to
misunderstanding. While criticizing the BOC makes for
dramatic impact, made-for-TV soundbytes and bright-red
tabloid banners, it plays into fallacies where true
competence remains obscured by inaccuracy.
Fortunately, one area where the BOC’s achievements are
undeniable, definitive and are based on unadulterated
statistics is its aptly labeled RATS campaign. The
Run-After-The-Smugglers (RATS) anticorruption program
under the office of the deputy commissioner for legal
affairs achieved where nearly a century of enforcement
failed.
On the
issue of money well spent, for an economy reeling from a
debilitating deficit, RATS established a record of sorts
and earned for the bureau’s legal team special and
international recognition from donors allowing it, not
simply to perform well, but also through proven
performance, to merit increased and expanded funding.
Here, performance begets support. Through RATS, the
bureau received $3.13 million from the USAID/Millennium
Challenge Account that had, for its objective, both
revenue-administration improvements and anticorruption.
It additionally received P105.5 million from the
Presidential anticorruption fund.
There is
nothing more eloquent than its record established under
Customs Deputy Commissioner Reynaldo Umali, a
half-a-decade-old hand at the bureau, but a neophyte to
the klieg lights that come with proven competence.
Before
we start, let us reset our scales where criteria is
relevant and focused on what impacts directly on public
welfare. We will especially pinpoint competent
prosecutorial performance in food and energy
sectors—critical commodities where current crises
impact. After all, while the net that the BOC casts is
large, not every fish caught fall under these criteria.
From the
inception of collections under the Western model of
capitalism and free enterprise, from 1902 to June 2005
only 77 antismuggling cases have been filed. That is the
reality. And that, unfortunately, is far worse than even
our worst nightmares of the ingrained dereliction, if
not the systemic corruption, infecting the BOC.
Umali
had his work cut out. However, since he took the reins,
from July 2005 to April 18, 2008, a total of 72 cases
have been filed under RATS. Increasing from 11 in 2005,
to 17 in 2006 and 32 in 2007, this is empirical proof of
an internal growth performance rate of 72 percent. Under
RATS, the BOC is likely to file as much as 55 cases
before 2008 ends.
These
successes threaten crooks and invite ferocious
retaliation. But the numbers cannot be denied.
To
appreciate its significance, situate the detail of
specific RATS cases along the economic impact of
unmitigated increases in petroleum prices, staple and
grain prices and domestic agricultural development. The
details reveal the relevant, if not critical, impact of
the BOC’s legal team on current crises and its
importance along these criteria.
In one
case as much as P19.5 million in diesel-fuel smuggling
was stopped by the BOC’s legal team. In another, P2.2
million of diesel and, in yet another, P469.4 million of
kerosene. Add here the withdrawal of 100,000 liters of
diesel at the Clark ecozone.
On the
aspect of staple and grain prices, the BOC legal team’s
RATS record includes cases involving over P3.2 million
worth of glutinous rice and separate instances of P2.03
million, P9.3 million and P21.6 million worth of wheat
flour.
The BOC
legal team’s successes involve not merely photogenic
smuggled luxury vehicles and elephant tusks. More
important, these impact on the greater agricultural
sector and the fragile economy we all rely on. |
