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Summary:
The stagnation of the Philippine economy has now lasted
over 25 years. Between 1990 and 2005, the Philippines’
average annual GDP growth rate was the lowest in Southeast
Asia, being lower than even that of Laos, Cambodia and
Myanmar. Explanations rooting the country’s failure to
launch in overpopulation, corruption, protectionism and
noncompetitive wages are examined in this article and
found grossly inadequate. The central bottleneck is the
gutting of the government’s capacity to invest owing to
the policy of prioritizing debt repayments and the severe
loss of government’s revenues due to trade liberalization.
In contrast to the Philippines, our neighbors promoted
policies that saw state investment synergized private
investment. This accounted for their superior economic
performance, especially before the Asian financial crisis.
Until the reigning policy framework is overturned the
country will not be able to emerge out of stagnation.
***
ASSAULTED
on all sides owing to its entanglement in the ZTE-NBN
corruption scandal, the administration has confronted its
critics with the image of an economy that is purring along
and doing just fine except for the rise in the price of
rice, for which it says it is blameless.
Deconstructing ‘growth’ in 2007
But the
state of the economy, even in the view of some of the
administration’s friends, is a thin reed on which to
rest. In a recent article, Peter Wallace, an influential
consultant, deconstructed the 7.3-percent growth rate
recorded for the Philippines in 2007, showing the figure
is actually a statistical fluke that stems from the way
the gross domestic product (GDP) is computed. The figure
actually masks something negative: the fall of imports by
5.4 percent. “So because we had less imports, GDP looked
good,” Wallace says. “From where I sit, that does not
indicate a strong, growing economy, the best in 31 years.”
With no less irony, the World Bank agrees: “Remarkably,
weaker import growth made the largest arithmetical
contribution to the growth acceleration in 2000-07
compared with 1990-99.” It added that this was not
“consistent with sustained fast growth in the longer
term.”
The
reality, Wallace points out, is indicated by the same
brutal numbers: more poor people in 2007 than in 2000,
more people without jobs, a real decline in average family
income, the shrinking of the middle class as more people
jump ship and swim to other shores. “Notwithstanding
higher growth,” the World Bank chimes in, “the latest
official poverty estimates show that between 2003 and
2006, when GDP growth averaged 5.4 percent, poverty
incidence increased from 30.0 percent to 32.9 percent.
This level of poverty incidence is almost as high as it
was in 2000 [33 percent]. Indeed, the magnitude of poor
Filipinos rose to its highest level in 2006: of a
population of 84 million in 2006, 27.6 million Filipinos
fell below the national poverty threshold of P15, 057.”
If you pop
the famous “Ronald Reagan” question to most Filipinos—“Do
you feel better off now than four years ago?”—there is no
doubt about how they would answer.
For many
people, the main problem confronting the economy is
spelled G-M-A. But for those who have spent time studying
the Philippine economy, Arroyo is not the problem, but
part of a bigger problem that extends far into the recent
past. The collective responsibility of the last five
administrations for our economic malfunctioning becomes
stark when viewed in a comparative context. According to
the latest Human Development Report of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), with the growth in GDP per
capita averaging 1.6 percent per annum in the period 1990
to 2005, the Philippines’ economic growth record was the
worst in Southeast Asia, with even all the so-called
lower-tier Asean countries significantly outstripping it.
Say that again? OK. Now, Vietnam (5.9 percent) is not a
surprise. But, for Christ’s sake, Laos (3.8 percent),
Cambodia (5.5 percent) and Myanmar (6.6 percent)?
So what
are the real causes of this state of stagnation that has
now lasted for over 25 years?
There is,
of course, the old overpopulation-causes-poverty school.
The weight of decades of research, however, is that it is
economic growth that causes a significant decline in
population growth—the so-called demographic
transition—instead of reduced population serving as the
trigger for economic dynamism. This is not to say that a
slowing of the population growth rate does not make the
burden of development lighter. It does, and fertility
control also contributes positively to women’s
empowerment, which is why contraceptive programs continue
to be critical.
It is,
however, the other, seemingly more solid explanations for
the Philippines’ failure to launch that interest us here.
There are three that are particularly popular with the
establishment: corruption, protectionism and high wages.
Let’s look at these closely.
Is it
corruption?
Undoubtedly, the most popular is Peter Wallace and the
World Bank’s favored answer—that is, that cronyism and
corruption are holding the Philippines back. This view is
reinforced by the news that, for two years in a row, the
Philippines has been designated the “most corrupt economy”
in
Asia by the
influential Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC).
Now, there
is no doubt that corruption erodes governance, subverts
democracy, and is morally corrosive. And there is no doubt
in this writer’s mind that the illegitimate occupant of
Malacañang deserves to be hung, drawn and
quartered—legally, that is, not physically—for presiding
over one of the most corrupt regimes in the history of the
Republic. However, it is another thing to say that
corruption and cronyism are mainly responsible for the
Philippines’ failure to get out of the stagnation in which
it is mired. One must be skeptical of this explanation
because in many other societies, periods of rapid growth
have also been periods of endemic corruption in politics,
and this observation includes England in the 18th century,
the US in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and
Korea
in the late ’60s to the ’80s.
Closer to
home, corruption pervaded the politics of our Southeast
Asian neighbors, such as
Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia, during their period of rapid
industrialization from the mid-’80s to the mid-’90s, when
they experienced 6-percent to 10-percent growth rates.
Indonesia under Suharto, for instance, occupied the
position the Philippines is now in, being regularly rated
as the most corrupt government in Asia. Double-entry
bookkeeping, tax evasion, bribing of politicians and
bureaucrats, and massive fraud were legendary in Thailand
in its boom decade.
Observations casting doubt on the correlation between
stagnation and corruption have received confirmation from
more systematic studies. Focusing on Southeast Asia,
Mustaq Khan and Jomo K.S. found no simple correlation
between the extent of rent-seeking and long-run economic
performance and found the thesis that crony capitalism
caused the Asian financial crisis of 1997 a rather dubious
one. Working with a bigger global sample, I.A. Brunetti,
G. Kisunku and B.Weder’s research found that, if at all,
the impact of corruption on GDP growth was not
significant. Other studies have found that, as in the case
with population growth and poverty, the direction of
causation is more likely to be from poverty to corruption
rather than the other way around.
Summing up
the conclusion of a slew of studies on growth and
corruption, Herbert Docena says, “Too many empirical
anomalies undermine the conclusion” that corruption is a
significant explanation for economic backwardness. What
research has done is simply to confirm the intuitive sense
that the customs agent that builds a house with ill-gotten
wealth stimulates the economy as much as the middle
manager who builds one with her legitimate savings. The
difference between them lies not in their economic effects
but in what their ethical and legal destinies should be:
the former deserves to go to jail, while the other
deserves to enjoy the fruits of her labor.
There is
an added problem with the corruption explanation for
stagnation, Docena argues. The popular discourse that
attributes economic backwardness to corruption and
cronyism plays into the dynamics of elite politics and
that of multilateral institutions like the World Bank.
“Corruption discourse” is the preferred weapon in the
political competition among the different factions of the
elite. It is discourse that performs the function of
allowing elites to compete and succeed one another in
office without fatally destabilizing a social structure
that is shot through with inequity.
The
neoliberal explanation
Another
favorite explanation is that stagnation stems from the
“strong” protection offered to domestic industry. The
Philippines, it is said, has not been exposed enough to
market forces that would have shaken it out of its
“inefficiency.”
The
problem with this analysis is that, in fact, the
Philippines was subjected to radical tariff liberalization
in the 1980s and 1990s. Under programs imposed by the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the
1980s, the average tariff rate was brought down from 43
percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1985, while quantitative
restrictions were removed on more 900 items between 1981
and 1985. This process of liberalization was accelerated
in the mid-1990s under the Ramos administration’s
Executive Order 264, which sought to drive down tariffs on
all but a few sensitive products to between 1 percent and
5 percent in 2004.
Moreover,
the liberalization program in the Philippines was often
more profound than those of our neighbors, which were
growing by leaps and bounds while we stagnated. For
instance, by the end of the ’80s, the average tariff rates
in Indonesia and the Philippines were just about equal,
while Indonesia had a greater proportion of goods
subjected to nontariff barriers than the Philippines.
Compared with Thailand, which was, in many ways, the best
performer among the Southeast Asian “newly industrializing
countries” (NICs) in the 1985-95 period, the Philippines
was much farther along the liberalization road: by the end
of the ’80s, the effective rate of protection for
manufacturing in Thailand was 52 percent, compared with 23
percent for the Philippines.
In fact,
in the 1980s and 1990s, the strategy of our neighbors was
not one of indiscriminate liberalization such as that
pursued by Philippine technocrats, but one of strategic
protectionism-cum-selective liberalization that was
designed to deepen their industrial structures. As one
wag trying to drive home the contrasting outcomes in the
Philippines and our neighbors put it, the crucial
difference was that our technocrats preached free trade
and practiced it, while our neighbors boasted of their
free-trade credentials while practicing protectionism. In
other words, in world ruled by economic realpolitik, it is
often not a virtue to practice what you preach.
Management’s story
A third
explanation favored by the establishment is that too much
legal protection of labor has made wages rigid and
noncompetitive with other Asian countries, thus making the
Philippines an unattractive investment site.
Though it
has been successfully used by management to dampen wage
demands, this argument is seriously undermined by the
facts. The real wage in 2003 was only 80 percent of what
it was in 1980 and labor’s share in GDP has dropped from
75 percent to 65 percent. In contrast, capital’s share of
GDP has increased by 10 percent and the profit rate has
shown an upward trend, from 8 percent in 1985 to nearly 13
percent in 2002. The Spanish economist Jesus Felipe and
his Filipino colleague, Leonardo Lanzona Jr., argue in a
study for the Asian Development Bank that except in some
areas, Philippine labor-market policies cannot be seen as
the main culprit for the economy’s failure to lift off.
Indeed, they do not see an increase in current wages as a
problem since, seen from a neo-Keynesian perspective, the
Philippines falls into the category of being a “wage-led
economic regime,” where, owing to persistently low levels
of investment by capital, an increase in wages will lead
to a higher level of aggregate demand that will result in
a utilization of current excess capacity in industry,
leading to faster growth and more employment.
So why is
the
Philippines
stuck in what is effectively a low-growth path, where
unemployment and underemployment continue to rise even
when the economy is growing by 5 percent to 6 percent?
The culprit, Felipe and Lanzona strongly suggest, is low
capital accumulation or investment: “In the
Philippines…the lack of investment is a well-known
problem….It is possible that the Philippines’ low capital
stock per worker, due to lack of investment, has led to
higher markups and unemployment. Thus, the policy
prescriptions to reduce unemployment would be investment
and not labor-market reforms.”
The
investment conundrum
One cannot
then understand Philippine underdevelopment without
reference to the crisis of investment. From nearly 30
percent in the early ’80s, the ratio of investment to GDP
plunged to 17 percent in the mid-’80s and never really
recovered, staying at 20 percent to 22 percent in the
early part of this decade. The same pattern of collapse
and very weak recovery is also seen in the growth of
capital stock, which fell from an index of nearly 0.07 in
1983 to nearly zero in 1985 and leveled off at below 0.03
in the early part of this decade.
To
understand the dismal performance of investment over the
last two decades, one must situate these figures in their
historical politico-economic context.
While the
Marcos regime is often pinpointed as the culprit behind
Philippine underdevelopment, an equally decisive part has
been played by the post-Marcos administrations. The
private sector unraveled in the early 1980s owing to the
effects of a structural adjustment program—trade
liberalization-cum-monetary and fiscal tightening—imposed
by the World Bank and IMF at a time of international
recession. Describing the fatal conjunction of local
adjustment and international downturn, the late economist
Charles Lindsay said, “Whatever the merits of the SAL
[structural adjustment loan], its timing was deplorable.”
The collapse of industry, it must also be noted, took
place amid a political crisis that marked the transition
from the dictatorship to the presidency of Corazon Aquino.
Why
government spending was gutted
The
downward spiral of private investment was not met by a
countercyclical effort of government to shore up the
economy, as would be expected under orthodox macroeconomic
management. This was a catastrophic failure, and the
cause of it was external. Owing to pressure from
international creditors, the fledgling democratic
government of President Corazon Aquino adopted the
so-called model debtor strategy in the hope of continuing
to have access to international capital markets. This
approach was cast in iron by Executive Order 292, which
affirmed the “automatic appropriation” from the annual
government budget of the full amount needed to service the
foreign debt.
What this
meant is that instead of picking up the investment slack,
government resources flowed out in debt-service payments.
In the critical period 1986-93, an amount coming to some 8
percent to 10 percent of GDP left the
Philippines
yearly in debt-service payments, with the total amount
coming to nearly $30 billion. This figure was nearly $8.5
billion more than the $21.5-billion Philippine total
external debt in 1986. What is even more appalling is
that owing to the onerous terms of repaying debts that
were subject to variable interest rates and the practice
of incurring new debt to pay off the old, instead of
showing a reduction, the foreign debt in 1993 had gone up
to $29 billion!
What this
translated into was that interest payments as a percentage
of total government expenditure went from 7 percent in
1980 to 28 percent in 1994. Capital expenditures, on the
other hand, plunged from 26 percent to 16 percent. Debt
servicing, in short, became, alongside wages and salaries,
the No. 1 priority of the national budget, with capital
expenditures being starved of outlays. Since the
government is the biggest investor in the country—indeed,
in any country—the radical stripping away of capital
expenditures represented by these figures goes a long way
toward explaining the stagnant 1-percent average yearly
GDP growth rate in the 1980s and the 2.3-percent rate in
the first half of the 1990s.
The
antigrowth implications of the state’s being deprived of
resources for investment were very clear to Filipino
economists during the mid-’80s. As the University of the
Philippines (UP) professors who authored the famous 1985
“White Paper” warned: “The search for a recovery program
that is consistent with a debt-repayment schedule
determined by our creditors is a futile one and should
therefore be abandoned.”
Government
and investment: Contrasts with our neighbors
Why do we
focus on key policy decisions made in the period 1985 to
1995? The reason is that these decisions—in particular
the fateful decision to channel government financial
resources to debt repayment instead of capital
expenditures—go a long way toward explaining why our
neighbors leaped forward as we stagnated. Contrary to
doctrinaire free-market economics, institutional
economists argue that government financial resources
devoted to building physical or social infrastructure or
shoring up domestic demand “crowd in” rather than “crowd
out” private investment, including foreign investment. For
instance, one key study of a panel of developing economies
from1980 to 1997 found that public investment,
complemented private investment, and that, on average, a
10-percent increase in public investment was associated
with a 2-percent increase in private investment.
Now, the
key explanation for why our neighbors flourished in the
period 1985 to 1995 is that they were deluged with
Japanese investment that was relocating from Japan to make
up for the loss of competitiveness of Japan-based
production owing to the drastic revaluation of the
Japanese yen relative to the dollar under the famous Plaza
Accord in 1985. This flow of Japanese investment to our
neighbors was not accidental. Nor was it accidental that
the Japanese bypassed the
Philippines.
For while our external creditors were busy stripping our
government of resources for investment in infrastructure,
our neighbors were frantically devoting resources to
financing infrastructure to attract or crowd in Japanese
direct investment.
Indonesia,
for instance, attracted $3.7 billion worth of Japanese
direct investment between 1985 and 1990. A key reason was
the high level of government capital expenditures, which
came to 47 percent of total expenditures in 1980, 43
percent in 1990 and 47 percent in 1994. Or take Thailand.
It pushed down interest payments from 8 percent of
government expenditure in 1980 to 2 percent in 1995 and
raised capital expenditures from 23 percent to 33 percent.
In the late ’80s and early ’90s, Thailand received $24
billion in foreign direct investment from Japan, Korea and
Taiwan, or 15 times the amount invested by the three
countries in the Philippines, which came to a paltry $1.6
billion. There is no doubt that government capital
spending crowded in foreign investment in
Thailand
and the lack of it crowded out foreign investment in the
Philippines. And there is no doubt that, as Kunio
Yoshihara asserted, “This difference in the flow of
foreign investment from [Japan, Korea and Taiwan] produced
a significant disparity in growth performance of the two
countries during this period.”
Like all
clear-thinking investors, the Japanese were not going en
masse to a place where infrastructure was decaying and
where the market was depressed and poverty was increasing
owing to a political economy shackled by structural
adjustment and battered by the priority given to repaying
foreign debt. They were, in short, not stupid.
This trend
of continuing outflow of government resources in the form
of payments to creditors and the shrinking of capital
expenditures continued into the first years of this
decade. In 2005, according to the World Bank, 29 percent
of government expenditures was devoted to interest
payments to both foreign and domestic creditors and 12
percent to capital expenditures. Calculations by James
Miraflor of the Freedom from Debt Coalition put servicing
of foreign and domestic debt (most of which is said to be
owed to locally based foreign entities) at 51 percent in
2005, 54 percent in 2006 and 41 percent in 2007. This
configuration of government spending prompted the UP
School of Economics faculty to complain once again that
the budget left “little room for infrastructure spending
and other development needs,” though they did not follow
through on the policy consequences of their analysis. They
were joined—in an extraordinary example of hypocrisy,
given its historical role in foisting the debt service at
the head of the trough of government spending—by the World
Bank, which complained in a 2007 policy brief:
“The
Global Competitiveness Index ranks the Philippines at only
71 out of 131 countries, rating the country particularly
poorly on a majority of the infrastructure indicators. The
quality of transport infrastructure [which includes roads,
railways, ports, airports and logistics] is a particularly
serious concern, with consequences for trade-related
transaction costs and overall competitiveness. Recent
assessments indicate that transport infrastructure is
poorly maintained and badly managed, with years of
underinvestment, especially in maintenance.”
Not
surprisingly, with government capital expenditures
remaining low, total fixed investment has remained anemic,
indeed running at only 14 percent of GDP, which the World
Bank notes is “substantially lower even than during the
deep recession in the first half of the 1980s and
substantially lower than in most other larger East Asian
economies.” Durable equipment investment, it added,
reached a historic low in 2007. The problem, as usual, is
not the bank’s description of developments but its refusal
to see their origins in policies in the formulation of
which the bank was deeply implicated.
The other
shoe drops: Trade liberalization and the fiscal crisis
The
explanation for our national stagnation is not exhausted
by the priority our leaders accorded to repaying foreign
debt. Activist governments, we have seen, have been key
players in development in Southeast Asia. But the
Philippine government was incapacitated from playing this
activist role by a one-two punch delivered by external
forces. If the hemorrhage of payments on the debt hit it
on the expenditure side, trade liberalization, by
drastically reducing a very critical source of government
revenues, clobbered it on the revenue side. But before we
detail this second blow, the fiscal impact of trade
liberalization, it is important to place the latter in the
context of the comprehensive structural
adjustment-cum-trade liberalization program which choked
the country in the ’80s and ’90s.
It is
fashionable these days to decry the weakness of the
Philippine manufacturing sector, which was supposed to
play the role of absorbing a greater and greater portion
of the labor force into high-value-added jobs. Trade
liberalization was, in theory, supposed to reinvigorate
Philippine industry by, among other things, ending
monopolization. Instead, what happened was monopolization
increased as trade liberalization intensified. Why? It is
very likely that monopolization rose because weaker firms
were driven out of business by trade liberalization—an
understandable outcome, but one that did not fit the
neoliberal paradigm.
As noted
earlier when we discussed and dismissed protectionism as a
possible explanation for the
Philippines’
economic stagnation, trade liberalization in this country
was no joke. The effective rate of protection for
manufacturing was pushed down from 44 percent to 20
percent. That was achieved at the cost of multiple
bankruptcies and massive job losses—in short,
de-industrialization. The list of industrial casualties
included paper products, textiles, ceramics, rubber
products, furniture and fixtures, petrochemicals,
beverage, wood, shoes, petroleum oils, clothing
accessories and leather goods. The textile industry was
practically rendered extinct by the combination of tariff
cuts and the abuse of duty-free privileges, with the
number of firms shrinking from 200 in 1970 to less than 10
by the end of the century. As former finance secretary
Isidro Camacho Jr. admitted, “There’s an uneven
implementation of trade liberalization, which was to our
disadvantage.” While consumers may have benefited from
tariff cuts, he said, liberalization “has killed so many
local industries.”
Yet, the
negative effects of trade liberalization were not limited
to the erosion of the country’s industrial base. Trade
liberalization had fiscal effects. If the hemorrhage of
payments on the foreign debt blew a hole on the
expenditure side, trade liberalization, by reducing a very
critical source of government revenues, blew a hole on the
revenue side. The trade liberalization that started with
Executive Order 264—which phased in, beginning 1994, a
radical program to unilaterally reduce all tariffs to zero
to 5 percent by 2004—resulted in radically decreased
customs collections in a very short period of time. In
the period 1995 to 2003, while the value of imports grew
by 40 percent, customs collections of import duties
declined by 35 percent; imports rose from $25.5 billion in
1995 to $37.4 billion in 2003, but import duties fell from
P64.4 billion to P41.4 billion. As a percentage of GDP,
total customs collections fell from 5.6 percent of GDP in
1993 to 2.8 percent in 2002. As a percentage of
government revenues, customs duties and taxes from
international trade fell from 29 percent in 1995 to 19
percent in 2000 at a time that hardly any new revenue
sources had come on-stream.
Combined
with the outflow of debt-service payments, the collapse in
customs revenues precipitated the fiscal implosion, which
made it even more difficult for the government to finance
the capital expenditures necessary to crowd in both
domestic and foreign investment in order to decisively
lift the country from the stagnation of the ’80s and
’90s. Former finance secretary Camacho could not but
admit the obvious—that it was not so much failure to
increase taxation but the drive to decrease import
taxation that mainly accounted for the crisis in
government revenue: “The severe deterioration of fiscal
performance from the mid-1990s could be attributed to
aggressive tariff reduction.”
To say
this is not to excuse the current administration and its
predecessors from not making a greater effort at tax
collection, especially from their private-sector cronies,
just as our earlier remarks were not meant to excuse
corruption. It is mainly to achieve a clearer
understanding of the key structural factors and dynamics
that have condemned the
Philippines
to almost permanent stagnation. One can agree with Peter
Wallace that the Philippines needs a much bigger effort to
enforce taxation and punish tax evaders without having to
say that this failure is what precipitated the crisis on
the revenue side. Trade liberalization precipitated that
crisis, which resulted in, among other things, a further
crippling of the capacity of the Philippine state to play
a positive role in development.
When
paradigms blind
In
conclusion, the dominant explanations for the continuing
stagnation that has caused so many Filipinos to abandon
ship are deeply flawed. Why they continue to be popular is
due to their being easy to grasp (corruption) or
ideologically correct (lack of market freedom).
Alternative explanations are screened out because they are
not ideologically correct or because they are, like the
burden-of-debt thesis, simply unacceptable as explanations
and options for action to the establishment. Yet, it
requires no special intelligence to realize that the
massive amounts of money that have gone to paying our
creditors to service our constantly mounting external debt
was money that could not go to development. It cannot be
otherwise given that resources are finite. Sometimes such
truths can only be grudgingly accepted when events occur
that force their acceptance. For instance, it can no
longer be denied that Argentina’s five-year string of
10-percent annual GDP growth is due principally to
President Nestor Kirchner’s courageous act of essentially
defaulting on most of that country’s foreign debt and
channeling the money saved to domestic investment.
With the
failure of doctrinaire neoliberalism to both explain and
move countries out of underdevelopment, we are beginning
once more to appreciate the positive role of the state in
development, in its triple role of assisting the market,
disciplining the market and leading the market. What we
have tried to do here is to position the incapacitation of
the Philippine state as the central factor in explaining
the stagnation of the Philippine economy. The priority
accorded to repaying the foreign debt in the context of an
economy in crisis deprived the state of financial
resources to play its role as the economy’s biggest
investor, thus crowding out private investment. This
emasculation on the expenditure side was paralleled by a
crippling on the revenue side by the collapse of customs
revenues owing to aggressive trade liberalization. This
double punch amplified the depressive effects of the
policy framework of structural adjustment-cum-trade
liberalization that was imposed on the country in the ’80s
and ’90s with the acquiescence of our leaders. This
suffocating policy framework unfortunately lives on, with
minor adjustments, and as long as it remains this
country’s basic paradigm, it is difficult to see the
Philippines emerging from its long night of stagnation.
****
* President of the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC),
senior analyst at Focus on the Global South, and professor
of sociology at the University of the Philippines. The
author would like to thank James Matthew Miraflor and
Bobby Diciembre of the FDC for their assistance. |