|
WHEN the
Jpepa first entered our collective consciousness, its
critics had the upper hand. The nightmares they etched
into the public mind linger like disembodied ghosts even
when our most potent statutes readily safeguard against
imagined abuses.
The critical imagery conjured was an
effective first blow. Antiglobalization activists,
typically up in arms against nearly everything
globalization has to offer, painted the country as a
toxic wasteland should the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (Jpepa) be ratified. They noted
that the Jpepa exposes the country to imports of “toxic
and nuclear waste—including those ‘fit only for
disposal.’ Never mind the potency of constitutional
provisions that check these, and never mind that both
countries issued definitive and compelling diplomatic
exchanges allaying fears of toxic-waste dumping.
The next arena was even more passionate.
Seeing that the agreement opened up a restricted labor
market, one where, against specific Jpepa provisions,
exported labor might receive equitable treatment,
critical nongovernment organizations threw out another
roadblock. Citing mostly cultural factors, they claimed
that Filipino labor in Japan would be discriminated
against. Pandering to the cultural stereotype is easy
and is an effective way to conjure criticism by using
stock clichés. However, in scrutinizing the Jpepa’s
labor impacts, some specificity is important.
One, in the globalization order, the
least mobile compared with capital and technology is
labor. Capital and technology can go through cyberspace
and immediately, they are globalized. Even real property
can change hands at the click of a button on an
electronic deed. But labor, for it to be globalized,
requires gargantuan efforts. Such agreements that open
up restricted markets are not only rare, but also the
opportunities they bring to an economy like ours, where
labor exportation is a major contributor, cannot be
taken lightly.
Two, Japan’s promotion of technical
exchanges, one negotiated between a highly
industrialized economy and one such as ours, revitalizes
both and internationalizes economies and societies. This
is not only contained in the agreement but is an
integral policy of Japan worthy of emulation.
Three, the areas that Japan opens up are
not likely to adversely affect its domestic labor
market. Similarly, the experience with the Japanese
expatriates in our economy shows little, if any, adverse
impacts among local labor.
Moreover, Japan offers to open up
additional labor commitments. We are not talking about
more nurses and transvestites. Under the agreement it
offers “to take commitments on the residency status of
accounting, engineering, legal services, and specialists
in humanities and international services”. It is also
offering “to commit legal and taxation services sector
in addition to the supply of services by natural persons
as well as the removal of the limitation on the number
of licenses conferred to service suppliers thus
expanding the scope of occupations for which these
services may be supplied.”
Four, under Jpepa, Filipino workers are
granted “national treatment”. This means that foreign
nationals are entitled to the same terms and conditions
of work enjoyed by the Japanese doing the same type of
work ceteris paribus. While it is true that there are
strict language and training requirements, sans the
emotionalism, we might see in this the upgrading of
health-care labor where indeed language and training are
critical.
The most nebulous attacks upon the
bilateral agreement, however, were arguments that
labeled the Jpepa unpatriotic. Invoking a cocktail of
emotion, motherhood, flag and sovereignty issues,
critics centered on uncontestable paradigms. One
business publication constantly referred to Jpepa’s
benefits as hyperbole. According to a constant
editorial, “the benefits cannot match the loss of
sovereignty and the massive inroads into the economy to
be made by the Japanese as a result of being treated
like Filipino nationals. Under Jpepa, the Japanese will
act as if they owned the
Philippines.”
The myopia might have been valid in the
middle of the last century, but one wonders whether the
emotionalism remains relevant in a global world.
There lie the foundations of the attacks
upon Jpepa. Jpepa is a globalization proxy fight. Seeing
that the agreement is a ticket that jump-starts our
foray into the global economy, it is understandable why
antiglobalists and other discontents are passionately
against it. But then let us be fair. Labor exports and
debt have been our tickets for too long. Seeing beyond
disembodied ghosts, we might realize that, already,
we’ve been in the global economy, ready or not, and
Jpepa simply enhances our productivity.
As it is our global growth has already
been linked to Japan. Japan is our second-largest
trading partner. Where cost of capital is concerned the
yen is relatively inexpensive and rivaled only by
financing costs provided by China for developmental
infrastructure. Should free trade and financing between
our economies increase, each unit of financing requires
debtors to warehouse a prorated amount within its
treasury. This accomplishes two things.
It tempers the inordinate and
detrimental strength of the peso against a weakened
dollar thus improving our competitiveness. It also
strengthens the inherent value of our current account by
denominating reserves in a currency less affected by
political flashpoints.
Thus, Jpepa not only increases trade
between our economies but, in a very direct manner,
jump-starts our economy in such a way that strengthens
us against some of the most potent risks that
globalization inherently carries. |
