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“The
tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with
the blood of patriots and tyrants.”—Thomas Jefferson
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo did not celebrate the seventh
anniversary of the day she seized the presidency from
Joseph Estrada.
Palace
factotum Eduardo Ermita explains why Gloria Arroyo chose
to forget the defining moment of her life:
“Remember, one legacy agenda is healing the wounds of
Edsa, and we thought not celebrating will be one of the
steps toward healing any hurt feelings brought about by
Edsa 2. So the least we talk about it, the better, OK?”
But
Angelo Reyes, the AFP chief of staff who mutinied
against his commander in chief, believes the Edsa 2
anniversary should be celebrated because “the spirit
that brought the people there was love of country.’’
And so,
in deference to Reyes, I will honor and celebrate the
patriots of Edsa 2.
Here is
Mike Arroyo telling Nick Joaquin (Philippines Graphic,
March 5, 2001) why, how and what he and his wife did for
love of country:
“She had
really left the Cabinet at the right moment: the timing
was perfect. If she had tarried a moment longer, she
would have been too late for Edsa: she would have made
it there as an opportunist.
“And as
for the ill-feeling in Metro Manila, we tackled that by
going back to the door-to-door campaign: she went from
barangay to barangay explaining her motives,
outlining her program. And it worked. Then came the
impeachment trial, and from there, tuloy-tuloy na.
“There
was a time, honestly, when I felt I erred in advising
her to resign from the Cabinet. The masa in
Manila apparently wanted her to stick it out with Erap.
And when she started attacking him, everything fell on
us—grabe!—everything! But I told myself: it’s now
or never; if we lose here we’re totally destroyed and
it’s goodbye to her political career—but if we win here,
she becomes President! So we really fought.
“We got
all those Erap tapes from Ramon Jacinto and distributed
them all over. We bought one million and a half-million
copies of Pinoy Times to give away so the public could
read about the Erap mansions and bank accounts.
“And
when Edsa happened, we texted everybody to go running
there. Edsa, Edsa: everybody converge on Edsa! Panalo
kung panalo. Patay kung patay! Jinggoy had already
announced what they would do to us if they won.
“Chavit
Singson had Plan B involving elements of the military to
strike the first blow. They would kindle the spark by
withdrawing from the government, and one by one others
would follow: Class ’71 would also withdraw, then Class
’72, and so forth. But General de Villa warned that the
timing had to be precise because one untimely move
against the government and the military would
automatically defend it. The move must be made at what
de Villa called a ‘defining moment.’
“You
see, General de Villa had his Plan A, which was better
than ours, because his was focused on the chief of staff
and the service commanders. At past one o’clock p.m.
January 20, Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes defected, but we
knew that already the night before, when negotiations
had lasted until the small hours. By past 2 a.m. we knew
Reyes had been convinced to join. His only condition
was: show us a million people on Edsa so it will be
easier to bring in the service commanders.
“And
they asked when the crowd was thickest; we told them:
from three to five in the afternoon. So they agreed to
come to Edsa at around that time. But while hiding in
their safehouse, they got reports that General Calimlim
could not be located and their first thought was: ‘He’s
out looking for us!’ So they decided to rush to Edsa
right away. When they got there, why, there, too, at the
shrine, was Calimlim! He had been looking for them all
right, but to join them, not to arrest them!
“Our
group there was a backup strike force. In fact, it was
our group that won over to our side the PNP first. If
Panfilo Lacson had resisted, he and his men would have
been repelled: there would have been bloodshed, but not
on Edsa. In every place where Erap loyalists had a
force, we had a counterforce to face it, with orders to
shoot. And not only in Metro Manila. Carillo had already
been sent to the provinces; and in Nueva Ecija, for
instance, we had Rabosa. This was a fight to the finish.
That’s why those five days that Erap was demanding were
so important. He was counting on countercoups and
baliktaran.
“I was
negotiating with Pardo up to three o’clock in the
morning: niloloko lang pala kami. But I told him
point-blank: “If by six o’clock this morning you haven’t
given us the resignation letter, we will storm the gates
of Malacañang!’ But they insisted on more talk: with de
Villa up front, and my back channel debate with Pardo,
which even became a three-way contest, with Buboy Virata
pitching in.
“But the
threat to march to Malacañang was for real. And so was
the danger of bloodshed. I wasn’t telling Gloria
everything: I didn’t want her alarmed. So she didn’t
know about the orders to shoot.”
Have a
nice day.
Buencamino writes political commentary for Action for
Economic Reforms (www.aer.ph). |
